What is espionage and foreign interference?
Espionage is the theft of information by someone acting on behalf of a foreign power, or intending to provide information to a foreign power which is seeking advantage over Australia. Espionage can target defence, political, industrial, foreign relations, commercial or other information that is usually otherwise unavailable to the foreign power. Espionage is a crime punishable by up to 25 years imprisonment
Foreign interference involves covertly shaping decision-making to the advantage of a foreign power. It is hostile to our national interests and is different to the open and transparent actions of foreign states seeking to influence deliberations of importance to them. Interference is activity done in secret by, or on behalf of, a foreign actor that is deceptive, corrupting or threatening in nature and contrary to Australia’s sovereignty and interests.
What is the harm?
Espionage and foreign interference undermines Australia’s national security and sovereignty. It damages our international reputation and degrades our diplomatic and trade relations. It inflicts economic damage, degrades or compromises nationally vital assets and critical infrastructure, and threatens the safety of Australians. One of the most insidious features of espionage and foreign interference is that even a small level of activity can have severe consequences which take years to be realised.
Espionage and foreign interference in the 2020s
Espionage and foreign interference has supplanted terrorism as Australia’s principal security concern. The intelligence services of foreign powers are conducting espionage and foreign interference across public and private sectors, targeting our secrets, democratic institutions, military capabilities, critical infrastructure and community.
Travel limitations brought about by COVID-19 have seen an accelerated uptake and deployment of cyber and other methods by foreign powers to covertly pursue their intelligence goals here. We expect the start of domestic and international travel will see a return of more traditional tradecraft on top of this new heightened level of activity.
Hostile foreign intelligence services target us to:
- Understand our strategic alliances and defence relationships.
- Gain privileged insights into our strategic interests and positions on international diplomatic, economic and military issues.
- Gain commercial advantage on matters including our energy and mineral resources.
- Access our innovations in science and technology.
- Shape the actions of Australian decision-makers and public opinion in favour of the adversary.
The range, scale and sophistication of foreign powers engaged in hostile cyber espionage activity against Australian Government and private sector systems continues to increase. An increasing number of countries are pursuing a cyber espionage program as this offers high returns for relatively low cost and plausible deniability. The continued evolution of technology increases the sophistication and complexity of attacks, while also becoming increasingly accessible.
What ASIO does to counter espionage and foreign interference
Understanding and degrading the espionage and foreign interference activities of Australia’s adversaries is among the most challenging types of intelligence work. ASIO works with all government agencies and the private sector to increase awareness of the threat and to implement effective mitigation strategies.
We focus on two key areas:
- We discover espionage and foreign interference and degrade their impacts.
- Our advice hardens Australian Government defences against clandestine espionage and foreign interference.
Does ASIO collect foreign intelligence?
Foreign intelligence relates to the capabilities, intentions or activities of people and organisations offshore. Australia’s dedicated foreign intelligence collection agencies are the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and the Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (AGO).
ASIO collects foreign intelligence in Australia under warrant authorised by the Attorney-General, and incidentally through ‘human sources’. ASIO was given the responsibility for foreign intelligence collection under warrant as a result of the 1986 Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies because “ASIO is the only service which has been given special statutory powers to collect intelligence within Australia, with the warrant of the Attorney-General, in ways which, without such a warrant, would involve a breach of Australian law.”
The details of our foreign intelligence collection activities are highly sensitive, so we do not discuss them publicly.
The espionage and foreign interference threat environment—looking back
ASIO’s origins lie in the global espionage struggle between the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. When ASIO was established in 1949, we learned through the interception of Soviet communications that an espionage ring was active in Australia. Our later success in securing the 1954 defection of Soviet diplomat and KGB officer Vladimir Petrov put the issue into the public arena. Petrov’s testimony confirmed much of what ASIO had already discovered during five years of painstaking investigation.
For the next three decades, most of ASIO’s work focused on countering the threat of espionage and foreign interference directed against Australia by the Soviet Union and its allies. These foreign intelligence services were tasked with clandestinely cultivating and recruiting Australians in all walks of life to:
- Help the Soviet Union obtain classified information about Australia’s military capabilities, economy, government policy deliberations, technology, and trade negotiations.
- Exert influence on governments to develop policies or make decisions that were sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
- Operate ‘front organisations’ intended to influence public debate, business decisions, and governments to support Soviet policies or undermine United States and Western policies.
- Monitor and intervene in the activities of dissidents in the expatriate communities of Communist bloc states.
As is the case today, much of this activity occurred behind the scenes and only occasionally became public knowledge due to a crisis, a defection, or a major international incident.
The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s did not see an end to the use of espionage and foreign interference techniques by foreign powers—it increased, and continues to grow to this day as international competition increases and diversifies.