Introduction

The aim of this lecture series, to promote a comprehensive and coordinated approach to national security as part of a whole-of-government structure, resonates strongly with my own aspirations for the Australian intelligence community.

Contrary to what one reads from time to time about intelligence, which runs the gamut between two contradictory assumptions, that intelligence is either totally unnecessary or it is totally omniscient, I know from forty years of experience that intelligence – sometimes flawed, sometimes amazingly prescient and always subjective - makes a key contribution to national security: from intelligence that informs our strategic, economic or technical decision-making, to practical battlefield intelligence that protects the lives of our defence forces and helps them achieve their goals, to security intelligence that seeks to protect the nation from espionage, illicit foreign influence and to protect our citizens, at home or overseas, from threats such as terrorism. 

No matter how much people decry intelligence, debate the validity of its product and its subjective conclusions, poke fun at the bumbling spy stereotypes, claim it is spying needlessly on its citizens or chastise it for its failure to be omniscient, the fact is that Governments need intelligence if they are going to make the best decisions to protect national security and the lives and safety of their citizens.

I have spent the last nearly eight years in the intelligence business.  For six years, I served as head of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, about which I enjoy the singular luxury of not being able to say a single word.  Otherwise it would not be secret.

Having served as Director-General of Security for a year and a half now, I am constantly seized by the importance, the seriousness and the intensity of ASIO’s work.  

If I can say anything about ASIS and ASIO, it is this.  Because the intelligence business is, by its very nature, necessarily non-transparent, and the people who conduct that business must remain anonymous, the general public is largely unaware of the seriousness, professionalism and commitment, compassion and down-right decency of the people who carry out intelligence work on behalf of Australia, and Australians. 

They are people of whom we should be very proud, if only we knew who they were.

The Intelligence Business

Today, I should like to share with you some personal thoughts on the challenges the intelligence business faces as it is required to continue its significant contribution to national security.

The structure of the Australian Intelligence community has evolved over many years.  It has had to adapt to a wide range of new challenges and threats, as well as a rapidly changing operating environment.  From the point of view of security intelligence, which is the business of ASIO, these include:

The need to combat increasingly sophisticated forms of espionage, both human and electronic, i.e. threats posed traditionally by nation-states.

The advent of a range of security issues emanating mostly from non-state actors; which challenge more traditional concepts and methods of intelligence activities conducted by recognised states.

The realisation that many of these non-state threats are transnational cross-border issues that require countries to work together to resolve; allies and partners have become hugely important in the security intelligence business.

The increasing need to ensure that the information and capabilities resident in various national intelligence and law enforcement agencies are shared seamlessly and mutually supportively to achieve the desired whole-of-government outcome: protecting the nation, its interests and its people.

Let me expand a little on those themes.

The Threat Environment

ASIO has a responsibility to investigate threats to Australia’s security, and the lives of Australians, wherever they might arise – whether inside or outside our borders. 

In the case of state actors, foreign espionage or attempts by foreign interests covertly to influence legitimate political processes in Australia require us to be constantly on our guard. 

However, globalisation has made possible – and complicated – a new rash of foreign policy and security issues, which do not necessarily, or solely, depend on the actions and intentions of nation states. There are many obvious examples of such issues: the movement of people from unstable, poor countries to stable, democratic, prosperous countries governed by the rule of law; international organised crime; the threat of pandemics; the impact of climate change, the Internet and, of course, the growing phenomenon of terrorism.

What characterises these so-called “new-issues” – although none of them emerged in an instant out of thin air, some have been around for a very long time – is their global or transnational nature.  Their management transcends national boundaries and requires bilateral or multilateral cooperation – and that frequently includes intelligence cooperation.

Secondly, these sorts of issues challenge current social and legal thinking. For example, how do government and legal systems in liberal democratic countries address the asymmetric threat posed by terrorists?

And, relevant to ASIO, if terrorism is to be defeated by a combination of intelligence, police and community action, how do we organise ourselves to achieve that goal, as well as working with other countries overseas (some of them not all that like-minded) while preserving the inherent values of our democratic society?

With these sorts of questions in mind, let me talk about two of my current concerns: terrorism and cyber security.

Terrorism

There have been recent media reports questioning the value of Australia’s intelligence services and whether the post 9/11 increases in budgets and staffing were an over-reaction.  One article claimed that, compared to other risks, terrorism in Australia was a triviality. 

I personally would not regard the prospect of mass casualties arising from a terrorist attack in Australia as a triviality.

Protecting Australia against terrorism is not only about saving lives, it also protects the freedom and safety we enjoy in our day-to-day activities.

Our most important weapon for countering terrorism lies in having the best possible intelligence about the capabilities and actual intentions of people intending to commit a terrorist act – and then to use that intelligence to forestall such acts by appropriate legal means.

I can say quite bluntly – on the evidence available to me, Australia is a potential terrorist target.  This has become a persistent feature of Australia’s security environment.

Public statements by prominent terrorist leaders and other extremist propagandists have singled out Australia for criticism and encouraged attacks against us both before and after 11 September 2001.

There have now been no less than four occasions when I believe a mass casualty attack within Australia has been avoided only because of the good work of intelligence and law enforcement authorities.

And three of these planned attacks would have been the work of home-grown groups, inspired by the rhetoric and beliefs of the violent jihadist movement.

More than 40 Australians have had their passports revoked or applications denied for reasons related to terrorism.  In part, this occurs to prevent Australians seeking to travel overseas to support terrorism or to engage in it – whether to train, fight, or as part of a conspiracy. 

I mention these home-grown groups in particular because there is a tendency for Australians to see terrorism as an ‘overseas’ problem.

Most of those convicted of terrorism offences in Australia were either born in Australia, or have lived here since childhood.

So the threat today is just as likely to emerge from within our own communities, as it is to be imported.

That said, we do need to ensure a measure of perspective.

Those attracted to the jihadist ideology are not representative of broader Australians or any particular community group in Australia.

They are a tiny minority who have adopted a distorted set of beliefs.  We must as a nation consciously resist any temptation to defame, think ill of or discriminate against any of the multitude of different ethnic, social or religious groups that make up the modern polity of Australia just because of the actions of a tiny misguided minority.

Cyber Security

We are only just beginning to realise that the extraordinarily democratic institution of the Internet may in fact be a two-edged sword, with implications not simply for commerce and trade, social interaction and privacy, but also for modern national defence efforts.

From a national security point of view the Internet presents particular difficulties.  Counter-espionage and foreign interference have taken on renewed importance in recent years – in both their traditional forms and in ways that harness technology and the Internet. 

The explosion of the cyber world has expanded infinitely the opportunities for the covert acquisition of information by both state-sponsored and non-state actors.  Today, we see constant attempts by cyber means to steal the nation’s secrets, as well as information vital to the effective operation of critical national industries and infrastructure, not to mention commercial intelligence and criminal fraud.

The cyber world will be a principal mechanism of warfare in the 21st century.  Cyber has the potential to reduce the conventional and nuclear weapons advantage of a country; it can thwart or side-step kinetic advantage.

Combating cyber warfare and cyber espionage requires governments to work closely with business and the security authorities while taking carefully into account issues of privacy in a legal environment that is still not yet mature in terms of online activities. 

ASIO: An Accountable Organisation

For ASIO, there is an additional but hugely important challenge.

Given that our business is concerned with the security of Australia and the safety of Australians, there is legitimate public interest in what we do.  In fact, it is stronger than ‘interest’.  The public has a stake in what ASIO does, and how well we do it.

There are legitimate questions for the public to ask, including about how the public can be assured ASIO is using its intelligence collection capability in ways that is consistent with Australia’s democratic and social norms.  In other words, how is a necessarily non-transparent organisation like ASIO accountable for its actions?

The reality is that ASIO cannot be effective in our responsibility to protect Australia against threats while being an open book to anybody who might wish to read it.

Our ability to be discreet, and to protect information, is not just critical to our intelligence gathering efforts, it also goes to the heart of our standing with the Government and to our credibility with the public and our domestic and foreign liaison partners, from whom we receive crucial cooperation and information.

How do we address that issue of accountability?

ASIO operates within an extensive oversight and accountability regime that more than compensates for our low public profile.

We publish an unclassified annual report.

The Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security makes many of its reports public.

And I am fortunate enough to have the pleasure of appearing before Senate Estimates hearings on a regular basis.

The centrepiece of ASIO’s accountability framework, however, is the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 – the ASIO Act.

The architect of that piece of legislation – Justice Robert Hope – deserves enormous credit.  There can be no greater testament to his foresight than the fact that fundamental principles enshrined in the ASIO Act remain valid today.

As well as defining carefully ASIO’s specific roles and functions, Hope recommended legislating four key pillars that set the parameters for ASIO’s role in our democracy.

The first is ASIO’s unambiguous responsibility through its Minister – the Attorney-General – to the Government of the day.

This cannot be clearer in the ASIO Act, and in practice it means that the Government monitors our actions, scrutinises our performance and – most importantly – it decides what resources we should have.

The second is the mandated impartiality and special responsibilities of the Director-General of Security.

The ASIO Act emphasises the Director-General’s responsibility for providing impartial advice and it states clearly that the Director-General has a ‘special responsibility’ to ensure that “the Organisation is kept free from any influences… not relevant to its functions and nothing is done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned to further or protect the interests of any particular section of the community…”

This ensures ASIO is a tool of national security and nothing else.

The third pillar is the boundary that prevents ASIO from constraining legitimate democratic dissent.  Quoting again from the ASIO Act, section 17A says ASIO “shall not limit the right of persons to engage in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent…”

So ASIO has no authority to constrain free speech; we wouldn’t seek to do it, and it would be illegal if we did.

Fourth is the set of enduring thematic priorities for which ASIO has responsibility, or our ‘heads of security’.  Among them is politically motivated violence – which includes terrorism – and espionage and foreign interference.

The heads of security give ASIO a precisely defined responsibility to protect Australia against threats to Australia’s security.

In the 1980’s, Justice Hope recommended what is arguably the most important of ASIO’s oversight and accountability mechanisms – the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS).  Dr Vivienne Thom was recently appointed to this position.

I am a strong advocate of the role of the IGIS.  The IGIS provides assurance to the Government and people of Australia that ASIO operates according to the law and with appropriate propriety. 

The IGIS has full access to ASIO at any time.  In fact she has powers akin to a Royal Commissioner.  She looks at our warrants, our authorities to investigate, our observance of appropriate operating procedures and, of course, our overall adherence to the law.  There is very little the IGIS does not look at. 

Our other key oversight body, the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), reviews ASIO’s administration and expenditure, and may also conduct inquiries that have been referred by the responsible Minister or by a resolution from either House of Parliament.

In collecting intelligence, ASIO applies the principle of proportionality – the means for obtaining information must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed and the probability of its occurrence. 

What this means practically is that ASIO takes a graduated approach – the more intrusive the investigative technique, the higher the level of authority required, right up to the Attorney-General.

Most importantly, accountability and responsibility have in the years since the Hope report become part of the ASIO DNA.

The Australian Intelligence Community

Australia has, in fact, had a ‘security intelligence function’ for close to some 100 years, directed against espionage, sabotage and subversion. 

Successive Australian Governments have seen the role of ASIO, enshrined in the precise language of the ASIO Act, as being to protect against threats to our national life and the safety of the citizens of the sovereign nation of Australia.

The changing nature of the challenges to national security, from both state and non-state actors, has in recent years forced the national intelligence community, and particularly the domestic intelligence services, not to mention state and federal law enforcement, to undergo a hardly surprising, but still dramatic, series of changes to the way we go about the business of security intelligence.

In December 2008, the findings of the Smith Review of Homeland and Border Security were released.  The Review recognised that the existing national security arrangements were generally effective and that for the most part our departments and agencies were working well together. 

Importantly, it recommended that these national security agencies should be regarded as a community to ensure the agencies benefit from access to each other’s skills, experience and other capabilities.  Smith recognised that this community must be well connected and networked, and any cultural, technical and other barriers should be minimised. 

Importantly, too, Smith noted that, while there had already been significant improvements in access to national security information, some legislative, technical and cultural barriers to information sharing – within and between governments and the private sector – remained.

The intelligence community has generally operated on a ‘need-to-know’ basis.  Intelligence was only shared when there was a demonstrated requirement.  This created a silo approach within the intelligence community.  Australian intelligence agencies are now working much more on a ‘need-to-share’ or ‘responsibility to provide’ model, recognising that each agency could have valuable information about an important case.  The move is not simply towards information sharing, but also sharing each other’s capabilities to achieve whole-of-government outcomes.

Ric Smith said that addressing the threats we faced was clearly not a task for one agency, or indeed any one government acting in isolation.  Many current threats are cross-jurisdictional or transnational in nature.  In many areas it is business or the general community that are threatened.  And the capabilities and capacities to take action for identifying, preparing for, responding to and recovering from incidents lie not just with governments but also with business and the community.

Through the National Intelligence Coordination Committee, chaired by the National Security Adviser, intelligence agencies are making good progress towards a fully integrated, coherent and cohesive national intelligence community.

The Australian Intelligence Community may undergo further review in coming years.  In my view, Justice Hope’s comprehensive conceptual and legal framework for the management of intelligence functions in Australia’s democracy remains a key starting point for any review.

However, Hope did not and could not have foreseen the significant changes to the security environment brought about by globalised transnational threats and the information revolution, nor the degree to which a seamless and immediate national intelligence collection capability would be required to deal effectively with national security challenges.

The review will be a good opportunity to take stock of what is required to make an intelligence apparatus effective, efficient and yet accountable in the modern era’s security environment.

Recruitment

I cannot conclude without a commercial.

The nature of the threat we face, and the consequences if we get it wrong, is the reason the government has provided ASIO with the resources to grow to some 1800 staff, with offices in every Australian state and representation in a number of countries overseas.

Our employees come from many different backgrounds and skill sets.  We actively seek a diverse workforce. 

We offer a wide range of operational roles, such as Intelligence Officers, Intelligence Analysts and Surveillance Officers, through to a variety of specialist technical positions, administrative and many other roles you would expect to find in any large organisation.

University graduates are highly sought after by ASIO as potential intelligence officers and analysts.

There are numerous intakes for these roles through the year.  I am sure you will appreciate that the selection process is lengthy, as it incorporates extensive security and background checking, which can take some time.

If you are considering a career in the intelligence community, I encourage you to visit the website – asio.gov.au – and apply.

Conclusion

I hope my remarks today have shed some light on ASIO, the way it works and its interdependence with other national intelligence bodies and law enforcement.

ASIO’s task is a daunting one – and its importance weighs heavily on ASIO officers.  Their actions could mean the difference between thwarting terrorist plans, or a successful terrorist attack.

We know that, despite our best efforts, security can never be guaranteed or absolute, but we are determined to do whatever is lawful and appropriate to prevent terrorist attacks against Australia and Australians.

We go about our work methodically, deliberately and with great regard for the personal and collective rights of all Australians.

We must assiduously avoid the media spotlight.  As a result our successes are rarely, if ever, recognised publicly.

But avoiding the public spotlight does not mean our actions are never judged.  ASIO’s oversight and accountability framework means its officers are constantly being called to account for their decisions, actions and judgments. 

ASIO relies heavily on the cooperation and support of the Australian community.  We could not be effective without the substantial assistance we receive from individuals, businesses and community groups. 

That is why I value so highly opportunities such as today to speak to a group such as yourselves, perhaps the next generation of leaders in national security, about ASIO and its work – even if I cannot share some of the more interesting stories about the Organisation.