Report to Parliament 2008-09

Part Two: Output Performance

Output 1: Security Intelligence Analysis and Advice

Analysis in ASIO

Intelligence Reporting

Intelligence Advice

National Security and Intelligence Policy Advice

Proscription-Related Advice

Advice on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Neclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Weaponry

Advice to Business

The Register of Australian Interests Overseas

Border Security Advice

Visa Security Assessments

Critical Infrastructure Protection Advice

Advice for special Events

Analysis Support to Investigations

Leads Development and Analysis

Complex Technical and Tactical Analysis

Involvement in Litigation

Output 2: Protective Security Advice

Protective Security

Policy advice on Protective Security

Personnel Security Assessments

Adverse and Qualified Assessments

Counter-Terrorism Security Assessments

Adverse and Qualified Assessments

Contact Reporting Scheme

Output 3: Security Intelligence Investigations and Capabilities

ASIO's Collection Capability

Investigations and Operations

Counter-Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism Response

Special Powers Under Warrant

Capabilities

Open Source Intelligence

Physical Surveillance

Human Intelligence Collection

Language Capability

Technical Collection

Telecommunications Interception

Information and Communication Technology Capability and Connectivity

Protecting Capabilities and Information

Cover and Assumed Identities

Operational and Investigative Cooperation

Increased cooperation with the Australian Federal Police following the Street Review

Multi-Agency Cooperation

Cooperation with Overseas Partners

ASIO's International Engagement

Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Training Cooperation

Reseach and Development

Output 4: Foreign Intelligence Collection

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Output 1: Security Intelligence Analysis and Advice

Parts of this performance report have been excluded from the unclassified Report to Parliament for reasons of national security.

Analysis in ASIO

As both a collection and assessment agency, ASIO’s analytical capability is crucial to its ability to investigate, report and advise on national security matters.

Some ASIO analysis is strategic and thematic, for example, on Australia’s security environment or extremism and radicalisation in Australia. Other analysis is highly tactical and aims to reveal the significance of specific detail, relationships and linkages. In either case, the intelligence being analysed is often disparate and incomplete, providing only partial insight into complex intelligence questions.

ASIO’s analytical capability is supported by a range of information and analysis systems and techniques. Expert knowledge and sound reasoning along with an ability to express findings clearly are the keys to good analysis. ASIO draws from a long history of examining threats to Australia, particularly from terrorism and other forms of politically motivated violence, and espionage and foreign interference. ASIO places a significant premium on advanced training for analysts in order to develop and maintain their skills and knowledge.

Some ASIO analysis forms the basis of ASIO intelligence advice. It is provided to Commonwealth and state and territory governments – and increasingly the private sector. Other analysis supports and drives ASIO – and partners’ – intelligence investigations and operations. It might reveal a new lead, provide operational insight or be crucial to the planning or implementation of an intelligence operation.

ASIO analysts and collectors work together closely with regular feedback and evaluation on the extent to which collection is meeting analysis and assessment requirements. This helps ensure collection efforts are focused, carefully prioritised and their value maximised. It also produces an effective cycle whereby assessment priorities drive collection, collection is supported and informed by analysis, and collection and analysis are combined to provide reporting and advice that contributes to Australia’s national security.

ASIO’s international liaison relationships and domestic partnerships contribute substantially to ASIO’s analytical capability. As well as being an important source of intelligence and information, these partnerships enable assessment, analytical techniques and tools to be exchanged, ideas shared and judgments tested. International liaison arrangements are particularly important for threat assessment, as they provide information on specific threats that would be otherwise unavailable. Analytical exchange is also an important driver and facilitator for greater operational and diplomatic exchange between Australia and other countries.

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Intelligence Reporting

ASIO produced 2,738 reports and assessments in 2008–09. The audience for ASIO reporting is diverse and expanded in 2008–09. It now includes some 80 Commonwealth and state and territory agencies and departments within Australia, as well as additional foreign liaison partners in 60 countries.

Some security intelligence reporting is strategic and assists primarily Ministers and policy-makers. Other reporting is tactical and critical to calibrating operational threat responses, including by law enforcement and agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). ASIO’s classified threat assessments form the basis of the terrorism section of DFAT’s Travel Advisories.

In May 2009, ASIO launched a new product, the ASIO Brief, designed specifically to bring key security intelligence assessments and operational developments to the attention of the highest level decision-makers.

ASIO produced double the number of Insight reports compared with the previous year, a reflection of increased demand for this focused executive level product that provides strategic context on issues of current or emerging security concern.

ASIO also continued to deliver high-quality strategic and thematic analysis for Australian decision-makers and policy agencies.

ASIO’s National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) is responsible for 24/7 coordination and analysis of threat-related intelligence. Threat assessments report on threats to Australia’s domestic and overseas national security interests, threats to the interests of foreign countries in Australia, the threat from foreign intelligence services and threats to major events. Threat assessments are also used by Commonwealth and state and territory authorities to determine appropriate levels of protective security resourcing and response. In 2008–09, NTAC produced 1,594 reports, including 1,092 threat assessments and 138 threat analysis papers.

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Intelligence Advice

In addition to regular intelligence reporting, ASIO draws from its intelligence sources and expertise to provide a range of advice that contributes to Australia’s national security efforts. Some advice contributes to official processes – such as visa and other security checks – and other advice is in response to issues of current or emerging concern.

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National Security and Intelligence Policy Advice

At the strategic level, ASIO provides intelligence advice to the Australian Government through a range of high-level national security policy and coordination forums, including the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC), the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC), and the Homeland and Border Security Policy Coordination Group (HPCG).

In 2008–09, ASIO provided advice to NSC and SCNS on a number of security issues including counter-terrorism, counter-radicalisation, counter-espionage, and cyber security. The Director-General of Security participates in NSC meetings and is a member of SCNS.

The Director-General of Security is also a member of the NICC, which was established following Prime Minister Rudd’s 4 December 2008 National Security Statement. In early 2009, ASIO contributed through the NICC to the development of National Intelligence Priorities, which provide an intelligence collection management framework incorporating foreign, defence, security and transnational law enforcement intelligence issues.

ASIO also supported the development and coordination of policy on homeland and border security issues through participation in the HPCG.

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Proscription-Related Advice

The Criminal Code Act 1995 allows the proscription of a terrorist group in Australia. Before the Governor-General makes a regulation specifying an organisation as a terrorist organisation, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not the terrorist act has occurred or will occur); or advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred or will occur).

ASIO provides the Attorney-General with a ‘statement of reasons’ that details why a group should be listed under the regulations. ASIO assesses a range of factors when considering organisations for proscription, including – but not limited to – ideology, engagement in terrorism, links to other terrorist networks, threats to Australian interests, proscription by the United Nations or other countries and whether the group has been engaged in some form of peace process. The statement is drafted from unclassified and publicly available information but is informed by all information available to ASIO, including classified reporting.

ASIO provided statements of reasons on 13 groups that were re-proscribed in the reporting period. Also in 2008–09, and following review of all proscribed groups, the Attorney-General deemed that two groups – the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) – no longer met the statutory test for proscription. At the end of the reporting period there were 17 groups proscribed in Australia (see Appendix A).

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Advice on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Weaponry

Demand for ASIO advice on CBRNE-related issues increased in 2008–09. Typically produced in close cooperation with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, ASIO provided reports to counter-terrorism forums and external agencies, which assisted the implementation of both operational and policy measures to reduce the risk posed to Australia by CBRNE terrorism.

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Advice to Business

ASIO’s Business Liaison Unit (BLU) provides an interface between ASIO and Australia’s private sector. The BLU distributes unclassified security reporting to businesses in Australia to enable them to understand better the security environment and the threats they face, and assist them with security planning.

The BLU draws from the full range of ASIO’s information holdings and expertise, including the NTAC, ASIO’s Critical Infrastructure Protection area, and international liaison reporting. It distributes unclassified Business Security Reports covering a variety of domestic and international security topics. The BLU also provides information intended to help develop businesses’ security management capability. Such reporting covers physical, personnel and information security strategies.

BLU reports are available via a secure website offered free to businesses on a subscription basis. Subscribers also receive a quarterly BLU Bulletin, which provides news and updates about ASIO’s work.

The number of subscribers to the BLU website continued to grow steadily during 2008–09, with 680 subscribers compared with 398 in 2007–08. There was significant interest from the transport sector (aviation, maritime, freight, and mass-transit), the energy and resources sector (exploration, production, consulting engineering), banking and finance, telecommunications, stadium operators, shopping centres, property management and utilities. The BLU increased the number of security reports available for business subscribers on the website to over 200, compared with 140 in 2007–08.

BLU representatives liaise with industry associations to identify speaking opportunities and to contribute to trade publications and journals. These engagements cover all designated critical infrastructure sectors and specialist sectors such as the Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association and the Australian Hotels Association. The BLU also coordinates an ‘Executive Program’ where the Director-General of Security briefs chief executives of Australia’s largest corporations. This program is intended to raise security awareness at the most senior levels of industry.

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Border Security Advice

ASIO’s network of aviation liaison officers (ALOs) and maritime liaison officers (MLOs) was established in 2003 to provide an immediate representation and response capability for ASIO across the aviation and maritime sectors. In 2008–09, through regular participation in border security community meetings and via informal channels, ASIO’s border network provided direct connectivity with key aviation and maritime partners including the AFP, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and airport and seaport authorities.

ALOs are based at key airports around Australia and have established linkages with most regional airports nationally. MLOs are connected with maritime authorities across all states.

In 2008–09, in partnership with state-based police agencies and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Office of Transport Security), ALOs contributed to the Securing our Regional Skies program in Western Australia, Northern Territory, Queensland and New South Wales. The program enhances security and security awareness at regional airports.

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Visa Security Assessments

ASIO contributes to the security of Australia’s borders through visa security assessments. Any person applying for a visa to travel to, and remain in, Australia may have the application referred by DIAC to ASIO for a security assessment – an assessment of the threat that the person’s presence in Australia would pose to security (as defined in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act)).

In conducting a security assessment, ASIO draws on classified and unclassified information to evaluate activities, associates, attitudes, background and character, taking into account the credibility and reliability of information available. Where inconsistencies or doubts persist, ASIO may seek to interview the person.

ASIO limits its consideration in security assessments to factors related to ‘security’ as it is defined in the ASIO Act. Where ASIO determines that a person’s presence in Australia would pose a direct or indirect threat to security, ASIO may recommend against the issue of a visa.

ASIO processed visa security checks in order of referral from DIAC, taking into account any agreed priority cases (with particular emphasis on refugee, humanitarian and protection cases, and genuine compassionate or compelling cases).

ASIO has continued to improve client service timeframes. The Next Generation Border Security initiative has improved the effectiveness and efficiency of security checking processes conducted by ASIO for applicants for Australian visas. Direct connectivity between DIAC and ASIO for the electronic transfer of security referrals and responses is now in place. This new system has improved the tracking and reporting of security referrals.

ASIO contributes entries to DIAC’s Movement Alert List to detect known persons of security interest who are attempting to obtain an Australian visa. ASIO completed 59,884 visa security assessments in 2008–09 (see Table 2). These comprised 12,988 assessments for permanent visa holders and 46,896 assessments for temporary visa holders.

In 2008–09, ASIO issued adverse security assessments for two individuals seeking entry to Australia. The visa applicants were assessed to pose a security threat due to links to a terrorist group or a foreign government.

ASIO conducts security assessments for protection visa applicants, including offshore applicants, unauthorised arrivals (those who travel by boat or air without relevant documentation or using false documentation), and applicants who arrive legally in Australia on a valid visa and who subsequently claim protection.

The Migration Act 1958 requires the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to make a decision on protection visa applications within 90 days. In 2008–09, 64 percent of protection visa applications assessed by ASIO were completed within the 90-day timeframe, an increase from 62 percent in 2007–08. Compliance against the 90-day requirement is measured through reports submitted to Parliament by DIAC. These reports are prepared in consultation with ASIO. Where delays are attributable to ASIO, cases exceeding 90 days are typically complex and require further investigation. ASIO continues to work closely with DIAC to resolve cases that exceed the 90-day timeframe.

In 2008–09, ASIO completed 1,466 assessments for protection visa applicants. This included 372 assessments for temporary protection visa holders applying for resolution of status visas, as a result of the Government’s abolition of temporary protection visas in August 2008. Protection visa assessments increased more than eleven percent from 2007–08.

There were no adverse or qualified assessments in the protection visa category in 2008–09.

Type of entry	2003-04	2004-05*	2005-06*	2006-07*	2007-08*	2008-09*	% decrease from 2007-08
Temporary	30,841	39,015	39,973	44,197	56,126	46,896	16
Permanent	13,881	13,402	13,174	9,190	16,562	12,988	22
Total	44,722	52,417	53,147	53,387	72,688	59,884	18

Table 2 Visa security assessments 2003-04 to 2008-09
*From 2004-05, figures include protection visas

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Critical Infrastructure Protection Advice

Critical infrastructure includes physical facilities, systems, information technologies and networks that if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on Australia’s social or economic well-being, or affect Australia’s defence or national security capabilities.

ASIO’s role in critical infrastructure protection involves identifying and ranking national critical infrastructure, and providing threat assessment advice. That advice is used by Commonwealth and state and territory governments – as well as private industry – to make decisions about risk and, on that basis, allocation of protective security resources.

ASIO engages closely with both Commonwealth and state and territory governments and private sector owners and operators throughout the threat assessment cycle. Engagement with owners and operators in the preparation of threat assessments is essential to gain an understanding of the characteristics and operations of critical infrastructure. In addition to distributing critical infrastructure protection threat assessments to a wide range of both Commonwealth and state and territory government departments, agencies and authorities, ASIO provides briefings to critical infrastructure stakeholders, including owners and operators from private sector business and industry. In 2008–09, ASIO briefed private sector representatives from 14 major financial sector companies, and 16 ports and shipping companies.

In 2008–09, ASIO produced seven sectoral and 17 vital asset threat assessments and provided 42 briefings to critical infrastructure owners and operators.

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Advice for Special Events

ASIO has considerable expertise in providing intelligence advice and operational support to special events. ASIO’s role in supporting special events may include:

• threat assessments to inform security planning;
• security assessments to inform venue access control;
• security assessments for individuals applying to travel to Australia to participate in or attend special events;
• physical security and risk management training and advice; and
• operational and technical support.

In 2008–09, ASIO provided security advice in support of three key international events – World Youth Day (WYD08) (Sydney, July 2008), the Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games (August–September 2008), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)forum (Lima, November 2008).

WYD08 was held without incident in Sydney between 15 and 20 July 2008. WYD08 was attended by close to half a million participants, including 130,000 international visitors. Along with His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, numerous cardinals and bishops from around the world attended.

In support of this event ASIO prepared threat assessments and security intelligence reports, including 27 event-specific security intelligence reports. ASIO provided WYD08-related security intelligence reports to the New South Wales Police and relevant Australian Government and New South Wales State Government agencies.

The 2008 Olympic Games were held in Beijing, China between 8 and 24 August 2008, followed by the Paralympic Games between 6 and 17 September 2008. There were no security incidents of concern to Australia. ASIO was a member of the Security and Intelligence Specialists for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (SISBOG), the official body for security and intelligence liaison. As a member of SISBOG, ASIO provided advice on intelligence gathering and assessment. ASIO worked closely with key Australian Government security stakeholders including DFAT, the AFP, and the Attorney-General’s Department. ASIO produced 64 Beijing Olympic Games-related reports.

Peru was the APEC forum host in 2008, which culminated in the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in Lima on 22 and 23 November 2008. Prime Minister Rudd attended for Australia, along with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. ASIO produced 13 APEC 2008-related reports for Australian Government customers.

ASIO will provide support for ten forthcoming significant events, including the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum (Cairns), the 2009 Parliament of World Religions (Melbourne), the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games, the New Delhi 2010 Commonwealth Games, and ANZAC Day 2010 commemorations in Gallipoli.

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Analysis Support to Investigations

Leads Development and Analysis

ASIO investigates thousands of new leads annually. The sources of ASIO’s leads include human and technical sources from intelligence operations, overseas liaison services, government agencies and police services, open sources, the public, and the National Security Hotline (NSH). A dedicated leads branch triages and assesses primarily counter-terrorism leads, including those received through the NSH.

In 2008–09, ASIO continued to work closely with Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement authorities to investigate and resolve intelligence leads. ASIO strengthened partnerships with Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in particular the AFP. This involved close coordination and cooperation at the national and regional level.

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Complex Technical and Tactical Analysis

ASIO’s complex analysis capability continued to provide crucial support to investigations in 2008–09. ASIO enhanced its capability to apply financial intelligence to security investigations, including through engagement with partner agencies and through participation in national and international working groups.

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Involvement in Litigation

ASIO provides information in response to, and as a contribution to, Commonwealth efforts in criminal, civil and administrative legal proceedings. Demand for such material, both from other government agencies and from defendants and applicants, has continued to increase. ASIO aims to balance protection of officer and source identities, collection methods and capabilities, and domestic and foreign relationships, with the need to support prosecutions and other legal processes in the interests of open justice.

In 2008–09, ASIO was involved in over 60 litigation matters. These ranged from support to prosecutions (in particular, terrorism prosecutions) to judicial and administrative review of security assessments, to civil actions. While the overall litigation volume remained comparable with that of the previous year, it is considerably higher than during any period preceding 2005. This high volume and the diversity and complexity of matters generated a significant work load. ASIO also responded to numerous requests for a broad range of material for use in litigation.

2008–09 saw verdicts in the Melbourne Pendennis terrorism trial. The prosecutions included ASIO intelligence as material in the form of documents, witnesses, and audio and video material. Supported and represented by barristers and external solicitors, ASIO’s in-house lawyers, intelligence and technical officers worked with support staff to identify, retrieve, review, collate and, where necessary, redact tens of thousands of documents and hundreds of hours of audio and video material.

In the Melbourne Pendennis proceedings in 2008–09, some of the defendants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation and other terrorism-related charges, and sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from six to 15 years. Three defendants were acquitted. One pleaded guilty before retrial to membership of a terrorist organisation and recklessly making a document connected with preparation for a terrorist act and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.[4]

ASIO was directly involved in two legal matters initiated by Mr Mamdouh Habib: appeals to the Full Federal Court and High Court against the November 2007 decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal upholding an adverse security assessment and denying him an Australian passport;[5] and a Federal Court compensation claim alleging the Commonwealth defamed him and aided and abetted his alleged mistreatment during his detention overseas. In March 2009, the Federal Court struck out a number of Mr Habib’s compensation claims on the grounds they had no reasonable prospects of success. ASIO provided instructions, material and documents in support of the defence of Mr Habib’s claims for compensation.[6]

Mr Belal Khazaal was found guilty in the New South Wales Supreme Court of making a document in connection with assistance in a terrorist act.[7]

The re-trial of former ASIO officer Mr James Seivers for unauthorised communication of national security intelligence, and of Mr Matthew Francis O’Ryan for aiding and abetting Mr Seivers, resulted in guilty verdicts and sentences of periods of weekend imprisonment. Mr Seivers lodged an appeal against his conviction on 26 June 2009.

To ensure support to Commonwealth litigation, and to manage legal issues across the Organisation, ASIO continued to invest in its legal team throughout 2008–09, and has established legal teams in Sydney and Melbourne. ASIO has continued to integrate lessons learned from prosecutions and other legal proceedings into policies and procedures.

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Output 2: Protective Security Advice

Parts of this performance report have been excluded from the unclassified Report to Parliament for reasons of national security.

Protective Security

ASIO provides protective security advice to the Australian Government, and with approval from the Attorney-General, to state and territory governments and private sector companies. Within ASIO, T4 is the primary area that provides protective security advice. T4’s advice typically includes recommendations on procedural, personnel and information security, along with physical security. T4 works with a wide range of organisations in Australia and internationally.

In 2008–09, ASIO recovered $1.68m of costs from providing protective security advice to clients. This advice included:

• protective security risk reviews;
• vulnerability assessments;
• certification and advice in relation to top secret facilities;
• ministerial office security reviews;
• evaluation of security equipment and consultants, locksmiths, couriers and classified waste services (on behalf of the Security Construction and Equipment Committee);
• protective security and risk management training and information circulars; and
• technical surveillance counter-measures testing.

In 2008–09, ASIO conducted security vulnerabilities assessments at ten airports, and additional assessments on several regional airports and maritime passenger terminals. This major body of work was commissioned by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government and fed into its regulatory decision-making processes. It also assisted a review of airport protective security arrangements following the death of a man at Sydney Airport in March 2009.

During the term of each Parliament, ASIO conducts two reviews of the adequacy of ministerial security arrangements. ASIO completed the first round of ministerial office security reviews in 2008–09. The second round of reviews will commence early in 2009–10.

ASIO certifies all Australian top secret facilities. Recertification of these sites is required every five years. ASIO certified 27 new sites in 2008–09, and an additional nine sites were inspected and will be considered for certification after completion of physical security improvements.

ASIO provides a Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures (TSCM) capability (including electronic surveys, monitoring of premises for possible hostile electronic activity, and physical security inspections) to the Australian Government to protect discussions at a national security or sensitive level. Throughout 2008–09, there continued to be a high demand for ASIO’s TSCM services.

ASIO contributed to the Australian Government’s 2008 Review of E-Security, including working with the Defence Signals Directorate and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to produce a wide-ranging classified assessment of the electronic threat environment.

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Policy Advice on Protective Security

ASIO provides the chair and secretariat for the Inter-Agency Security Forum (IASF), a consultative forum on government security issues. In 2008–09, the IASF, through a whole-of-government approach to protective security, continued to develop security policy, provided advice on the handling of highly sensitive information and reported to Government on the security status of agencies.

ASIO continues to drive a more strategic agenda for the IASF. In 2008–09, the IASF’s work program included:

• documenting emergent issues challenging government protective security regimes;
• streamlining the Top Secret (positive vetting) security clearance process;
• comprehensively revising the Classified Supplement to the Australian Government Protective Security Manual;
• auditing safehand and overnight courier companies endorsed by the Security Construction and Equipment Committee (SCEC); and
• reviewing SCEC’s endorsement criteria for safehand and overnight courier companies.

As IASF chair, ASIO produces an annual review on the protective security status of IASF agencies.

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Personnel Security Assessments

ASIO provides personnel security assessments to assist government departments and agencies in deciding whether to grant access to national security classified information.

Applicants for security clearances must provide detailed background information to their sponsoring agency and ASIO. ASIO’s personnel security assessments take into account intelligence information held by ASIO, as well as known risk factors. ASIO completed 21,699 personnel security assessments in 2008–09, consistent with a long-term trend of growth in the overall personnel security assessment workload (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Personnel Security Assessments 2000-09

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Adverse and Qualified Assessments

One qualified personnel security assessment was issued in 2008–09.

Adverse or qualified personnel security assessments issued by ASIO may be appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. There were no appeals in 2008–09.

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Counter-Terrorism Security Assessments

ASIO’s counter-terrorism security assessments are carried out at the request of government authorities who are responsible for accreditations, usually the AFP and AusCheck. In 2009, ASIO established direct connectivity with AusCheck for the electronic transfer of the information required to undertake counter-terrorism checks. This has provided greater efficiencies, and improved the tracking and reporting of security referrals.

ASIO completed 65,119 counter-terrorism checks in 2008–09 (see Table 3), 98 percent of which were completed within ten days. These included:

• 56,266 checks for Aviation and Maritime Security Identity Cards for pilots, trainee pilots, air and sea vessel crew, and persons requiring access to controlled areas at air and seaports;
• 7,948 checks for persons requiring licences to access ammonium nitrate; and
• 905 checks for staff and visitors to the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) facility at Lucas Heights, Sydney.

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Adverse and Qualified Assessments

No adverse or qualified counter-terrorism security assessments were issued as a result of counter-terrorism security assessments conducted during 2008–09.

Type of check	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09
Aviation/Maritime Security Identity Cards	58,147	38,466	71,733	118,118	70,084	56,266
Ammonium Nitrate	-	1,634	7,428	6,419	4,502	7,948
ANSTO	-	-	-	1,027	1,251	905
Commonwealth Games	-	-	56,149	-	-	-
G20 Finance Ministers Summit	-	-	-	1,580	-	-
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and World Youth Day	-	-	-	7,837	13,453	-
Total	58,147	40,100	135,310	134,981	89,290	65,119

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Contact Reporting Scheme

The Australian Government Protective Security Manual requires Australian Government employees to report suspicious, unusual, or persistent contact with foreign nationals as part of the Australian Government Contact Reporting Scheme. This reporting scheme is a valuable component of ASIO’s efforts to identify attempts to gain unauthorised access to sensitive information.

In 2008–09, ASIO promoted the scheme with over 90 presentations, including to state and territory agencies. Thirty-six government agencies provided contact reports to ASIO in 2008–09. There are a number of agencies that would be expected to have considerable contact with foreign nationals but that have relatively low reporting rates. ASIO has an active program of liaison with agencies to promote the reporting scheme and to encourage a culture of contact reporting within agencies.

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Output 3: Security Intelligence Investigations and Capabilities

Parts of this performance report have been excluded from the unclassified Report to Parliament for reasons of national security.

ASIO’s Collection Capability

ASIO’s work necessarily has a strong focus on investigation in order to determine the relevance to security of particular activities, the threat posed by the activities of persons and groups of security concern as well as the harm done to national security interest through those activities. ASIO’s collection capabilities are focused on high-tempo operational engagement with a wide range of national and international security and intelligence partners with a focus on human source operations.

ASIO draws on information from a variety of sources, ranging from publicly available information to covert and highly sensitive human source and warrant operations. Decisions to use intrusive techniques are made balancing the severity and immediacy of the threat and degree of intrusion into individual privacy.

Most of ASIO’s investigations require a variety of techniques. In 2008–09, ASIO strengthened its operational planning capability to ensure maximum utility was obtained from the deployment of ASIO resources.

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Investigations and Operations

ASIO’s investigative and operational effort is directed primarily at countering terrorism. However, counter-espionage, foreign interference and counter-proliferation are also high priorities. ASIO provides intelligence on the activities of individuals and groups assessed to represent a security threat to Australia or Australian interests.

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Counter-Terrorism

Counter-terrorism investigations remained ASIO’s highest priority in 2008–09, and this will continue for the foreseeable future. While other threats continue to grow and develop, few of these carry the immediate public safety threats and consequences.

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Counter-Terrorism Response

ASIO’s contribution to national counter-terrorism response arrangements is an important element of Australia’s overall counter-terrorism capability. Counter-terrorism response arrangements centre on the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC). The NCTC – established in 2002 under the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements – is responsible for whole-of-government counter-terrorism policy coordination and national counter-terrorism arrangements, including Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP).

The NCTC is supported nationally by several other bodies including the Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Policy Committee, the Australian Government Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Homeland and Border Security Policy Working Group.

The NCTC coordinates training courses and exercises which bring together Commonwealth and state and territory law enforcement and emergency management agencies to test and improve response arrangements across jurisdictions and organisations. In 2008–09, ASIO provided support to a range of NCTC exercise and training activities.

The NCTP identifies four key components of counter-terrorism activity – prevention, preparation, response and recovery. Under the NCTP, ASIO is responsible for:

• the National Intelligence Group, which coordinates and disseminates intelligence to support operational commanders and senior government decision-makers in the event of a major terrorist incident, or in support of Inter-departmental Emergency Taskforce arrangements;
• leading a multi-agency Forward Intelligence Analysis Team that would be deployed overseas in response to a terrorist incident in another country;
• maintaining a capability to deploy intelligence support overseas; and
• ongoing assistance for the conduct of investigations as part of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Team arrangements.

ASIO’s Technical Support Unit (TSU) is a rapid response capability which can be deployed under the NCTP framework to assist Commonwealth or state or territory authorities in the event of a terrorist incident. The TSU was not deployed operationally during 2008–09.

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Special Powers Under Warrant

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act) enable ASIO, subject to a warrant approved by the Attorney-General, to use methods of investigation such as telecommunications interception and access, listening devices, entry and search of premises, computer access, tracking devices and examination of postal and delivery service articles.

The ASIO Act also enables ASIO, with the Attorney-General’s consent, to seek warrants from an independent issuing authority (a federal magistrate or judge) for questioning of persons for the purpose of investigating terrorism. The warrants may authorise police officers to detain persons in limited circumstances. Any questioning pursuant to a questioning, or questioning and detention warrant must be undertaken in the presence of a prescribed authority (a former superior court judge, a current state or territory judge, or the President or Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) under conditions determined by that authority. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) has a statutory right to attend during any questioning or detention under the warrant. In 2008–09, no questioning or questioning and detention warrants were issued.

Only the Director-General of Security may seek a warrant. A written statement, specifying the grounds on which it is considered necessary to conduct an intrusive investigation, must accompany each warrant. ASIO warrants are issued for specified periods. At the expiry of each warrant, ASIO must report to the Attorney-General on the extent to which the operation helped ASIO carry out its functions. The IGIS has access to all ASIO warrant material and conducts regular and frequent inspections of ASIO’s warrant documentation.

The Director-General of Security may issue warrants for up to 48 hours in emergency situations. The Attorney-General must be advised of any such warrants.

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Capabilities

ASIO continues to develop its investigative capability and build partnerships within Australia and internationally to meet the operational needs of an increasingly complex security environment. ASIO’s collection methods include open sources, human sources, physical surveillance, technical collection and special powers operations under warrant.

Open Source Intelligence

Open sources provide a wealth of information. International news services provide continuous, near real-time monitoring of global events. Publications, the Internet and databases can provide valuable input to ASIO’s analytical and investigative work. Managing the volume of publicly available information can, however, be challenging, and the veracity of information in the public domain must often be tested against other sources.

ASIO’s Research and Monitoring Unit provides specialised open-source support to analysis and operational activity and conducts 24/7 monitoring of the global and domestic security environment through classified and unclassified sources.

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Physical Surveillance

ASIO’s physical surveillance capability is a vital component of the Organisation’s intelligence collection effort.

In 2008–09, ASIO continued the enhancement of its physical surveillance capability. ASIO recruited and trained additional surveillance teams.

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Human Intelligence Collection

Human intelligence sources – from community contacts, interviewees and members of the public who volunteer information through to covert, fully recruited ASIO sources who report against priority targets – enable ASIO to provide accurate and timely information on continuing and new sources of security threat. They are a valuable and flexible method of acquiring intelligence on the activities of those who pose a security threat. Human sources can provide unique access and context and can be tasked and developed over time to be deployed in a variety of roles.

In 2008–09, ASIO continued to build upon its long-standing program of confidential contact with leaders and influential members of various ethnic and religious community groups in Australia. This program provides ASIO with ready access to community members and an ability to contextualise information in response to specific developments or government information requirements.

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Language Capability

ASIO maintains foreign language capabilities to assist counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and foreign interference investigations. ASIO is implementing several projects and initiatives to augment its foreign language translation capability and capacity, and to maximise efficiencies in the processing and dissemination of foreign language product.

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Technical Collection

Technically-derived intelligence, such as data from telecommunications intercept, makes an important and often unique contribution to ASIO’s investigations and assessments. In 2008–09, ASIO continued its major investment in the development and delivery of technical collection capabilities. ASIO works closely with domestic and international partners – including industry – to maximise the benefit and efficiency of the complex development work which often underpins technical collection activity.

ASIO has technical capability to collect intelligence, as part of a special powers operation such as telecommunications interception. These capabilities, like all ASIO’s collection activities, are exercised in strict observance of the principle of proportionality – the means for obtaining information must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat. This is required by the Attorney-General’s Guidelines (see also pp. 60–61).

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Telecommunications Interception

ASIO is designated by the Attorney-General to be the lead Commonwealth agency in managing the development of interception and delivery capabilities for use by Commonwealth and state and territory intercepting agencies. In this role, ASIO works with the telecommunications industry to ensure comprehensive interception capabilities are in place. Under the TIA Act, carriers and carriage service providers are required, unless specifically exempted, to develop, install and maintain capabilities to provide interception to authorities. As a part of its ‘lead house’ role, ASIO provides technical advice to the responsible policy departments, the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) and Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE).

In 2008–09, ASIO, with the Australian Federal Police (AFP), contributed to work led by AGD and the DBCDE to develop an improved strategic dialogue with the Australian telecommunications industry. A new strategic forum has been established to consider national security and law enforcement issues relevant to the telecommunications sector. This will augment ASIO’s existing industry contacts for telecommunications interception and critical infrastructure protection.

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Information and Communication Technology Capability and Connectivity

While ASIO continues the development of its information and communication systems in line with the recommendations arising from the Review of ASIO Resourcing (the Taylor Review) in 2005, ASIO systems remain under pressure.

Challenges include the increasing tempo of work; the need to share relevant information quickly with an increasing range of government, business, community and international partners; and the requirement for ASIO to identify what is, and what is not, of intelligence relevance in much larger volumes of information. Similarly, ASIO’s growing involvement in judicial processes and the Organisation’s need to meet the requirements set by courts and tribunals in a timely manner are creating new challenges.

To meet these challenges during 2008–09, ASIO reviewed its information and communication technology (ICT) strategic plan; refined internal governance frameworks and processes supporting ICT business alignment; continued focus on the development and training of staff; and completed a range of ICT projects. The ICT strategic plan incorporates the Government-adopted recommendations from Sir Peter Gershon’s 2008 Review of the Australian Government’s Use of Information and Communication Technology.

To assist in analysing greater volumes of information ASIO introduced several analytical visualisation tools in 2008–09. One ASIO-developed tool provides for automated mapping and manipulation of data. The visual representation allows analysts to rapidly understand the nature of links between entities and better identify linkages of potential concern.

In 2008–09, ASIO enhanced its ability to undertake analysis of data with a geospatial element. This will also assist analysts in the identification of previously unknown links or associations.

The maintenance and development of ASIO’s supporting infrastructure remains a significant body of work. In 2008–09, this included the programmed replacement of server infrastructure and, where possible, the virtualisation of servers to reduce power and space requirements while reducing hardware costs. This is an important ‘greening’ initiative.

Major initiatives for 2009–10 will include commencement of a three-year redevelopment of ASIO electronic information management systems; updating ASIO’s electronic information storage infrastructure; the introduction of a new ASIO-wide Top Secret desktop and standard operating environment; the development of a new intranet for corporate information; and a new ASIO Internet site.

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Protecting Capabilities and Information

ASIO’s priority investigations often occur in uncertain and rapidly evolving environments. They rely frequently on highly sensitive collection capabilities, including human sources and technical operations.

In recent years extremists have acquired broad knowledge of intelligence methodologies. Drawing upon this knowledge, they have adopted more sophisticated methods, making it more difficult for ASIO to monitor them.

ASIO carefully considers police and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions requests to use its material as evidence, and in most cases is able to assist. Some of this material must, because of its sensitivity, retain a national security classification. It is generally provided in closed court and may be judicially determined to not form part of the publicly available record of the trial.

In 2008–09, ASIO worked closely with the legal community to ensure suitable arrangements for protecting the identity of ASIO witnesses.

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Cover and Assumed Identities

ASIO has cover arrangements to protect the identities of ASIO officers. Knowledge of the real identities of ASIO officers could be used to compromise the Organisation’s work, and the safety of staff.

Assumed identities can be used for intelligence collection, operational support, intelligence training, surveillance duties, and administrative support.

All use of assumed identities in ASIO is authorised under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and in accordance with the Law Enforcement and National Security (Assumed Identities) Act 1998 (NSW).

The Commonwealth legislation allows the Director-General of Security, and delegates, to authorise the use of assumed identities and the acquisition of supporting documents from Commonwealth, state (except New South Wales) and territory and non-government agencies.

New South Wales legislation is used by ASIO in addition to the Commonwealth scheme where assumed identities are required in New South Wales.

Two audits of assumed identity records were conducted in 2008–09. There were no discrepancies or breaches detected for either the Commonwealth or New South Wales schemes.

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Operational and Investigative Cooperation

ASIO liaises with Commonwealth, state and local government partners, the private sector and with overseas partners for assistance on inquiries, investigations and in support of operations. Joint counter-terrorism work by intelligence and policing agencies requires cooperation and management of resources at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to avoid duplication or confusion, and to maximise outcomes of coordinated ASIO and police activity.

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Multi-Agency Cooperation

In early 2009, a joint ASIO-AFP team was established in ASIO’s Leads Branch to evaluate leads received from the National Security Hotline (NSH). The team has centralised and coordinated the evaluation of new leads across Australian Government agencies, reduced duplication of analytic and investigative effort, and streamlined and enhanced investigative responses. An out-posted AFP officer is embedded in the team, and new processes are in place to develop combined ASIO-AFP assessment of each NSH report. The establishment of the team has resulted in significant resource efficiencies for both ASIO and the AFP, as well as a more comprehensive and timely response to new information. The AFP’s extensive criminal information holdings and ASIO’s intelligence holdings and access to Australian intelligence community resources are brought to bear simultaneously for each case, providing quicker and better assessments of lead information, reducing duplication for both ASIO and the AFP and ensuring appropriate priority is given to investigations. This is of particular value during high operational tempo.

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Cooperation with Overseas Partners

ASIO’s International Engagement

Most security threats to Australia have origins or linkages outside Australia. The international threat environment is complex and dynamic. Developments in areas which previously have not been a source of security concern may very quickly become directly relevant to ASIO’s work. Globalisation, particularly the transnational nature of international terrorism, as well as espionage and foreign interference, means that security matters with links to Australia may be uncovered anywhere in the world. In addition, security intelligence investigations in Australia often contain links to countries and overseas groups and individuals. This requires ASIO to have an effective, well-established and strategic international liaison network to provide the global reach necessary to pursue threats wherever they may be.

In 2008–09, visits to and from Australia continued to provide ASIO with opportunities to reinforce Australian interests and enhance areas of common interest.

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Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Training Cooperation

ASIO provides training to overseas intelligence and security agencies. The Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Training Program (CTITP) delivers counter-terrorism training and capacity-building to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation with and between partner agencies.

CTITP programs were presented by ASIO officers, supported as appropriate by members of Australian Government and state government agencies, and external consultants with expertise in counter-terrorism. Programs were conducted in Australia and overseas.

CTITP continues to assist the AFP in delivering intelligence training at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Indonesia.

CTITP’s flagship program is the annual International Counter-Terrorism Seminar. In 2009, 27 intelligence and security agencies from 15 countries were represented. The seminar encourages information exchange and fosters the concept of counter-terrorism success through interaction and cooperation.

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Research and Development

ASIO’s research and development efforts have increased the capability of its people and systems. The Science Adviser contributes to the pursuit of innovation in all areas of ASIO through in-house research and development; collaboration with international and domestic partners; engagement with industry and academia; and human resource development. ASIO collaborates with government-funded research agencies such as the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). A senior DSTO officer is a full member of ASIO’s Research & Development Committee (see also pp. 59–60).

Through the Science Adviser and its Research & Development Committee, ASIO engaged with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and other stakeholders to focus on advancing broader national security interest in research and development. ASIO is contributing to the development of the National Security Science and Innovation Strategy.

In 2008–09, the Science Adviser developed a framework for ASIO to capture innovative ideas and facilitate their development.

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Output 4: Foreign Intelligence Collection

ASIO collects foreign intelligence in Australia under warrant and through human sources at the request of the Minister for Defence or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Foreign intelligence deals broadly with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign power. It covers political, economic, and diplomatic matters and also threats against the security of Australia. ASIO works closely with the other Australian agencies dedicated to foreign intelligence, namely the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation.

The work performed by ASIO varies considerably according to the nature of the target and the means of collection and information processing employed. In some cases, ASIO performs much or all of the operational work and makes the collected intelligence available for processing and reporting by DSD or ASIS. In other instances, ASIO’s role is largely limited to preparing and coordinating the warrants required for the work and the tasks of collecting, processing and reporting the intelligence fall to the foreign intelligence community. In all instances, ASIO reports to the Attorney-General on the information collected under foreign intelligence warrants and its intelligence value.

This performance report has been excluded in its entirety from the unclassified Report to Parliament for reasons of national security.

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Continue Reading - Part Three

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4 A further defendant pleaded guilty in 2007.

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5 On 4 September 2009 Mr Habib was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Full Federal Court decision, which had dismissed his appeal relating to the decision to issue an adverse security assessment and refuse to grant him an Australian passport.

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6 A further application by the Commonwealth to strike out Mr Habib’s claims of misfeasance in public office and harassment was heard on 14 and 15 September 2009 by the Full Federal Court. Judgment is reserved.

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7 On 25 September 2009, Mr Khazaal was convicted and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of nine years. Mr Khazaal will not be eligible for parole until 31 August 2017. Mr Khazaal has filed a notice of intention to appeal his conviction and sentence.

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