Report to Parliament 2008-09

Part One: Threats and the Security Environment

Threats and the Security Environment

Terrorism

Global Terrorism Environment

Terrorism and Australia

Major Incidents and Impact on Australia

Local Terrorism

Mumbai attacks

Radicalisation and Extremism in Australia

Overseas Links and Influences

LeT and Links to Australia

Regional Trends and Developments

Afghanistan and the Subcontinent

Middle East and Africa

South-East Asia

Espionage and Foreign Interference

Promotion of Communal Violence

Violent Protest

Proliferation

Outlook for the Security Environment

Terrorism

Espionage and Foreign Interference

Violent Protest and Communal Violence

Proliferation

Threats and the Security Environment 2008-09

Security threats to Australia and Australian interests evolved further in 2008–09. As in previous years, the new dimensions of threats built on – rather than replaced – existing elements, adding new layers of complexity to the challenges of terrorism, espionage and foreign interference.

Terrorism

Global Terrorism Environment

Terrorism remains a serious and immediate threat to Australia, Australian citizens and Australian interests globally. Terrorist intent is typically strategic, its targets tactical and the destruction indiscriminate. Terrorism is expected to be a destabilising force for the foreseeable future and a persistent feature of the global threat environment.

The greatest terrorism threat is from the violent jihadist movement comprising core al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Sunni Islamic extremist groups allied or associated with al-Qa’ida, and individuals or groups motivated by the violent jihadist ideology. In recent years, this violent jihadist movement has suffered setbacks through the death or imprisonment of many of al-Qa’ida’s leading figures. But core al-Qa’ida remains resilient and committed to achieving its political goals through extreme violence. Of particular concern are safe havens, such as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and potentially now also in Somalia. These allow violent jihadist groups to recruit, incite, train, and prepare for terrorist attacks internationally. The strategic importance of defeating al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan is central to strategic success against terrorism.

Al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorism is not, however, the only terrorism concern with international implications. Shi’a extremism, in particular that affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah’s External Security Organisation (ESO), also has global reach and – to a lesser extent – influence.

In terms of terrorist tactics and capability, improvised explosive devices continue to be the weapon of choice, followed by firearms and incendiaries. Small, person-carried bombs, vehicle-bombs and armed assault are favoured tactics. The attackers in Mumbai in November 2008 employed explosives – including grenades – and small arms in tactical assaults, indiscriminate killings and siege-hostage situations. These tactics are not new, but the scale and operational complexity of the Mumbai attacks were notable and had not been seen previously in India.

Terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida continue to maintain an interest in chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons.

Terrorists will continue to target places where population is concentrated, including mass gatherings, and critical infrastructure.

Terrorism and Australia

In 2008–09, Islamic extremists again identified Australia as a target for terrorism. In October 2008, an audio interview with the leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, contained a thinly veiled threat against the United Kingdom, United States and Australia ‘about what’s coming’ on their home ‘turf’. In November 2008, a Taliban video statement warned the United States, Australia and several other countries with military deployments in Afghanistan of future attacks unless they withdrew their forces.

Major Incidents and Impact on Australians

Two significant terrorist attacks overseas in 2008–09 involved Australian civilians. In November 2008, two Australians were among the over 165 people killed in attacks in Mumbai and Australians were among the more than 300 injured. On 3 March 2009, five Australians were travelling in the Sri Lankan cricket team convoy in Lahore, Pakistan, when it was attacked by assailants using small arms, rocket launchers and hand grenades.^[2]

Local Terrorism

The number of known Islamic extremists – those willing to use violence in pursuit of political objectives – in Australia is very small but significant and did not change substantially in 2008–09. Local extremists can be particularly difficult to detect and their potential for harm is disproportionate to their small number. Overseas experience demonstrates that small groups with relatively unsophisticated methods can cause substantial destruction and disruption. Successful attacks can also embolden others.

New extremists were identified in Australia in 2008–09. Their alleged intent to participate in terrorism in Australia or overseas – and for some allegedly to contemplate suicide – underscores the enduring propensity for al-Qa’ida-inspired ideology to resonate strongly within larger but still small groups in Australia.

Mumbai attacks

The 26–29 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai were the most significant terrorist incident in 2008–09 in scale, complexity and diversity of targets. At least 165 people, including two Australians, were killed in the attacks and more than 300 were injured. Planned and executed by Pakistan-based Islamic extremist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), the incident lasted some 60 hours. It paralysed India’s usually vibrant commercial and entertainment capital, and played out under the intense gaze of the international media. The terrorists combined a range of relatively simple but highly effective tactics, including armed assault, grenades and explosives, indiscriminate killing, and hostage sieges.

The attacks were intended to damage the Indian Government and undermine investor confidence in the Indian economy, and possibly precipitate a hostile response by India to derail the Kashmir peace process.

Arriving by sea in southern Mumbai, a group of ten heavily armed militants separated into five pairs and proceeded via taxi or on foot to a range of pre-selected targets, in some cases killing while in transit. The five main targets of the attacks were all located within a three mile radius in southern Mumbai and included two hotels, a café, a train station and a Jewish centre. The inclusion of the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels and the Nariman House as targets was a departure from the LeT’s previous attacks in India, which have primarily focused on public spaces or places of religious or political significance. Killing was indiscriminate and included locals and foreigners.

The mobile-unit style of small-arms attack used in Mumbai was not new. However, the combination of elements on such a scale and against such a range of targets in a single attack had not been seen before. The protracted spectacle of the attacks and their highly disruptive nature are likely to inspire others.

ASIO deployed officers to New Delhi immediately after the attacks. Working closely with Indian authorities, these officers facilitated the flow of information to the National Threat Assessment Centre and other customers in Australia.

Mumbai 2008 (photo courtesy of AAP)

Radicalisation and Extremism in Australia

Radicalisation is the process by which a person’s beliefs or ideas move from those held by the majority towards a more extreme world view, often striving for far-reaching societal change. Extremism is one possible end point of radicalisation and includes the acceptance and willingness to use violence.

There is no single path to becoming an extremist. However, in most cases, the driver for individuals to transition from retaining grievances and holding beliefs to taking action lies in the dynamics of small, isolated groups.

Violent jihadist extremists in Australia – like those elsewhere in the world – possess an identifiable ‘mindset’ composed of a particular world view, including an historical narrative that the West has been hostile to Muslims since the emergence of Islam, and an underlying rejection of secular, Western society. Despite being factually incorrect, the single historical narrative is particularly important because to them it proves Islam and Muslims are persecuted by the West.

ASIO is conducting a variety of activities to help identify individuals and groups intent on acting on extremist beliefs. These range from constructive long-term engagement with influential community and religious figures and associations, through to investigations relating to specific extremists or extremist threats.

Overseas Links and Influences

Australia’s security environment is heavily influenced by international events. Overseas links and events can provide the source of inspiration or motivation for activity in Australia. Some of the links are more direct and can include overseas extremists in contact with Australians or Australians seeking to gain terrorism training or other capability for use in Australia or overseas.

The Middle East, South Asia and now East Africa are the primary sources of motivation and capability for extremists in Australia. Small numbers of Australians continue to look to theatres of conflict overseas for inspiration; some aspire to participate in the violence or seek to learn from the tactics and techniques employed by extremists overseas.

There has been no reinvigoration of coordinated support from Australia for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – or any other extremist group – in South-East Asia.

The pattern of Australians wishing to travel overseas for terrorism-related activity was similar to previous years, with a small number acting on their intent. Some participated in combat overseas.

LeT and Links to Australia

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) – the group responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks – was originally established to oppose India’s control of the disputed Kashmir region. LeT aligned itself ideologically and operationally with al-Qa’ida, particularly after 11 September 2001. The Mumbai attacks were the most recent – and most destructive – demonstration of LeT’s commitment to al-Qa’ida’s global jihad objectives.

Australian links to LeT were evident in October 2003 when ASIO became aware of a group in the early stages of planning a terrorist attack in Australia.

The central figures were Faheem Khalid Lodhi – an Australian citizen who had held a leadership position in an LeT training camp in Pakistan – and Willy Brigitte, a French national and LeT-trained explosives expert sent to Australia to work with Lodhi. Lodhi and Brigitte were consequently convicted of terrorism offences, the latter in France.

Regional Trends and Developments

Afghanistan and the Subcontinent

The threat environment in much of South Asia remains grim.

In Afghanistan, suicide bombings against Afghan Government interests and international forces are a key militant tactic. Foreign civilians are at constant threat from kidnapping and assassination.

A number of militant groups operate in Afghanistan, all of which seek to undermine the Afghan Government and reject Western influence. Afghanistan has also attracted individual Islamic militants from around the world, including Australians.

Islamic militants in Pakistan continue to conduct major attacks in urban areas. The 20 September 2008 attack on Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel underlines the threat to Western interests and the determination of extremists to destabilise the government of Pakistan. The Marriott Hotel attack used the largest ever bomb in a suicide vehicle bombing. It killed some 60 people of various nationalities, injured around 260 more and destroyed much of the hotel.

Politically motivated violence is a routine feature of the Indian security environment, with frequent violence from separatists, Maoists and Islamic militants. Four attacks in July and September 2008 were claimed by Indian Mujahidin (IM). IM’s near-simultaneous bombings in urban centres have focused on Indian interests, but it also targets sites popular with tourists and expatriates. There is an increased potential for Westerners to be targeted in terrorist attacks in India, as evidenced by the 26–29 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai in which two Australians were killed and three injured.

In late May 2009, Velupillai Prabhakran and most of the senior members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka were killed, signifying military defeat for the group. The last surviving senior figure, Selverasa Pathmanathan, was appointed leader and publicly called for the group to renounce violence.

The deaths of its core leadership in Sri Lanka, and Pathmanathan’s intention to adopt a political path to its goals, leaves the LTTE without adequate direction or motivation to mount a coordinated or effective armed offensive. But some survivors of the military campaign may revert to terror tactics in an effort to pursue the LTTE’s separatist agenda.

Middle East and Africa

Somalia emerged as an area of major terrorism concern in 2008–09. The volatile security environment there is conducive to the growth of Islamic extremist groups and its profile as a battle front for al-Qa’ida’s offensive has increased significantly. Al-Shabaab – a loose alliance of clan-based militias formerly aligned with the Union of Islamic Courts – conducted coordinated suicide-vehicle bombings in northern Somalia on 29 October 2008. At least 28 people were killed and 30 others wounded. The simultaneous suicide attacks occurred in areas of northern Somalia which had previously been considered safe for aid workers. One of the suicide bombings took place inside the United Nations Development Program compound. The attacks were aimed at destabilising transitional governing bodies and repelling foreign involvement in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab expanded its influence in Somalia during the first half of 2009 and, together with other Islamic militant groups, engaged in a violent insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and African Union peacekeeping forces. The group’s objectives of repelling foreign forces and establishing an Islamic state have resonated with elements of the Somali diaspora, including in Australia, as well as with Sunni Islamic extremists around the world, including al-Qa’ida. Some al-Shabaab members subscribe to al-Qa’ida’s global jihad agenda and maintain the intent to conduct terrorist attacks in, and outside, Somalia.

The Middle East threat environment remains highly volatile. Sunni Islamic extremists, particularly those affiliated with al-Qa’ida, planned or prepared for a range of attacks across the region – many of which were disrupted. Militants continued to attempt to undermine the effective governance of countries in the region and to attack Western interests directly.

The security environment in Yemen deteriorated considerably in 2008–09. The al-Qa’ida-affiliated group, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which relocated to Yemen as a result of disruption by Saudi authorities, is increasingly active.

On 17 September 2008, AQAP conducted a sophisticated attack against the United States Embassy in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and small arms. The attack demonstrated the group was capable of attacking high-profile, hardened Western targets. The group also claimed responsibility for the March 2009 suicide attack against South Korean tourists in Yemen. A second suicide attack against a South Korean delegation was attempted three days later.

Extremists remain active in Syria and Lebanon; many of them have participated in the jihadist insurgency in Iraq.

Despite the failure of the Lebanese Hizballah-led coalition to gain a majority at the 7 June 2009 parliamentary elections, Lebanese Hizballah remains the strongest political organisation and armed group in Lebanon.

South-East Asia

Extremists linked to key JI operative, Noordin Mohammad Top, remained the most significant threat to Western interests in Indonesia. Mention of the Bali bombers’ martyrdom in a 1 December 2008 statement by al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, would have provided encouragement to South-East Asian extremists keen to have their efforts recognised on the global stage.

JI more broadly remains in a consolidation and rebuilding phase but has not abandoned its intent to achieve political and social change through violence. It remains, therefore, a serious terrorism concern.^[3]

Terrorism in Thailand is mostly limited to a violent separatist insurgency in the Muslim-dominated southern provinces. Australian and other Western interests have not been targeted specifically in the violence.

There are ongoing hostilities in the Philippines between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippines Government.

Espionage and Foreign Interference

Espionage is not defined in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act), but criminal offences relating to espionage are set out in Division 91 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

Some espionage can arise from foreign interference activity, where a country’s foreign intelligence service finds opportunity to cajole or coerce into cooperation one of its former nationals with access to sensitive Australian Government information. The original purpose of their targeting may not have been directed at espionage, but intelligence services are opportunistic and will often try to turn such opportunities to their advantage.

In other cases, espionage arises from deliberate efforts by foreign intelligence services to penetrate governments, their intelligence services, their departments and agencies, and strategic sectors of industry in pursuit of secret intelligence or commercial and economic advantage.

Australia remained a target for espionage in 2008–09.

Acts of foreign interference are defined in section 4 of the ASIO Act. Most acts of foreign interference investigated by ASIO are activities carried out by a foreign government or one of its instrumentalities, are clandestine or deceptive, and are carried out for intelligence purposes, in order to affect political or governmental processes, or are otherwise detrimental to Australia’s interests. Some acts of foreign interference involve threats to a person and do not need to be clandestine or deceptive to fall within ASIO’s mandate.

Australia has a significant history of foreign diplomats and officials collecting information on, and sometimes actively targeting, individuals in Australia who are perceived as dissident, disloyal, or otherwise likely to act in ways unwelcome to their country’s government. Some of this activity is conducted quite overtly in the course of regular consular or community liaison by foreign officials. Other activity is covert and carried out by foreign intelligence officers or their contacts, co-optees and agents in the community. Some genuine diplomats undertake intelligence tasks on behalf of their government.

Promotion of Communal Violence

No information came to ASIO’s attention in 2008–09 to indicate significant ongoing tensions between any community groups within Australia. ASIO was alert to the potential for communal violence as police investigated criminal activity against Indian students in Australia. Specific incidents outside or within Australia have the potential to cause short-term tensions resulting in some violence between communities. Usually the communities engage in lawful and peaceful protest action to demonstrate their concerns.

Nationalist extremist and racist extremist groups did not undertake organised or premeditated violence in Australia towards ethnic or religious communities in 2008–09.

Violent Protest

Most protest activity in Australia is peaceful and lawful and therefore not of concern to ASIO. Section 17A of the ASIO Act mandates that the Act shall not limit the right of persons to engage in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. However, a small number of individuals consider the promotion and use of violent protest tactics are justified in order to influence government policy or to achieve other political ends. This activity can fall within the definition of politically motivated violence in the ASIO Act and, therefore, be of interest to ASIO.

No significant violent protest occurred in Australia in 2008–09.

Proliferation

ASIO’s counter-proliferation work focuses on detecting and preventing attempts to exploit Australia’s industrial, technological and educational resources for the illicit development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Australia has continued to increase its legislated obligations to ensure compliance with various United Nations Security Council Resolutions aimed at preventing the spread of WMD, with particular emphasis on Iran.

Outlook for the Security Environment

Terrorism

Australia will remain a terrorist target for the foreseeable future. Within Australia, terrorism-related activity will continue. Extremist ideology will continue to resonate with a small but dangerous minority, so there is a high likelihood of local terrorist groups emerging from time-to-time. Some Australians will continue to support extremism financially, logistically or by involving themselves in terrorist operations in Australia, or overseas.

Overseas terrorist groups might seek to conduct operations in Australia, either unilaterally or by seeking support locally. Overseas groups targeting Australia are more likely, however, to attack in their home country – as has been the case in Indonesia.

Australians and Australian interests overseas will continue to be among those indiscriminately targeted by terrorists – as in Mumbai and Indonesia.

The Middle East is likely to remain the global origin of terrorism threats and extremism. It will continue to provide the major focus and inspiration for extremists in Australia. Concerns about Israel-Palestinian conflict and United States influence in the Middle East will continue to sustain the ideology of extremists.

Continued instability and extremism in East Africa, mainly Somalia, is a growing concern to Australia. It is likely the continued instability will see an increased threat of terrorist attacks against Western interests in some East African countries.

Despite counter-terrorism successes, extremists with the desire to plan and conduct terrorist attacks, and an ability to build bombs, pose a continuing threat in Indonesia. JI is currently in a consolidation and rebuilding phase but has not abandoned its violent Islamist goals. JI has never been the only player in terrorism in Indonesia and even attacks ascribed to JI involved individuals drawn from a variety of extremist organisations. The terrorism environment in Indonesia remains fluid, and provides new avenues for Australia-based sympathisers to support Islamic extremism in South-East Asia.

Ongoing instability in Pakistan’s tribal areas creates a fertile operating environment for extremist groups who pose a threat to Western interests in Pakistan and internationally. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) – particularly given its previous links to Australia – will remain a particular concern. LeT remains focused on destabilising the Pakistan and India peace process and the Mumbai attacks demonstrated a willingness to target Western interests in India to achieve this goal. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the Commonwealth Games to be held in New Delhi, India in 2010.

ASIO expects fundraising for the LTTE to continue, but at a much reduced level. At this time it is unlikely LTTE members will target Sri Lankan interests in Australia for acts of violence. Some LTTE members may seek to enter Australia to escape Sri Lankan Government scrutiny.

Espionage and Foreign Interference

Espionage and foreign interference directed against Australia and Australian interests will continue. New technologies will allow new and different forms of undeclared intelligence activity, but the tried and true methods of cultivating, recruiting and running human sources with access to confidential information, secrets and sensitive technology will continue.

Australia will remain an important target as a source of intelligence not least because we are a close United States ally; active in the Asian region; suppliers of energy, mineral resources and technology; a potential source of commercial information and influence; and home to people who may be viewed by foreign governments as dissidents or separatists. Global commercial and economic competition – for resources, energy, technologies and competitive advantage – will blur the boundaries between nation-state and commercially driven espionage and require ASIO to broaden its role outside traditional counter-espionage boundaries.

Electronic attacks via the Internet occur frequently, originate from a range of sources and will persist.

Violent Protest and Communal Violence

Most issue motivated groups will continue to use peaceful and non-violent disruptive protest tactics. A very small proportion of activists continue to believe violent protest tactics are an effective means of influencing government and business decision-makers. These individuals are likely to plan for violent protest activity at selective anti-war and anti-globalisation protests.

Proliferation

Countries of proliferation concern will continue to adapt and evolve their procurement activities to thwart WMD control efforts. Australia will remain of interest to them, including because of our technologically advanced industry and military, strategic alliances and world class educational facilities. ASIO expects the need for counter-proliferation intelligence support for regulatory and enforcement agencies to increase. ASIO also expects an increase in the need for its advice on WMD matters in general.

Continue Reading - Part Two

2 In July 2009 (shortly after the close of the reporting period), three Australians – including a senior Australian trade official based at the Australian Embassy in Indonesia – were killed in an attack on the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. Other Australians were injured.

Back to Report

3 The 17 July 2009 near-simultaneous bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta carried all the operational signatures of Noordin Mohammad Top. ASIO had consistently assessed that Top would attempt another anti-Western attack in Indonesia when he – or a trusted associate – considered it operationally feasible to do so, but there was no intelligence to forewarn of the attacks. Top and three of his associates were killed during an Indonesian National Police counter-terrorism operation in Solo, Central Java, on 17 September 2009.

Back to Report