Australian Transport Ministers' Meeting
Director-General's Address
Australia's Security Environment
28 February 2007
Deputy Prime Minister Vaile, State and Territory Ministers, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this important meeting of State, Territory and Federal Ministers and officials on the issue of the current security environment with a particular focus on the security of Australia's surface transport.
Our effectiveness as a nation in countering the threat of terrorism is dependant on how well agencies at all levels of government, the business sector and the wider community work together in the common interest to counter the plans of a small but dangerous group of extremists.
Let me set the scene.
A terrorist attack in Australia is feasible and could well occur.
That has been the situation since 2001 and is unlikely to change any time soon.
We are a target because of who we are – a Western country, aligned with the United States, the United Kingdom and others who are seen as ‘crusader' nations.
The terrorist threat confronting Australia is likely to last for some years and have both global and home grown dimensions.
More than five years after the 2001 attacks in the United States the threat from global Islamist terrorism continues to evolve.
We are seeing more evidence of attacks planned in Western countries by residents of those countries.
Terrorists are adapting to counter-terrorism measures and looking for new ways to achieve their objectives.
And, while the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies have had an impact on known extremists, new extremists continue to emerge.
As a nation we are now much more aware that Australians are at threat from the actions of terrorists.
Tragically, Australians already have been killed or injured in attacks abroad.
Attacks in Australia have been planned and, fortunately to date, disrupted or aborted.
But an attack here could occur at any time, including without prior warning.
We have seen what can happen in other countries with attacks by extremists in Madrid and Jakarta in 2004; in 2005 in London, Sharm al Sheikh in Egypt and again in Bali; and in 2006 in Mumbai to name a few.
The main terrorist threat to Australia continues to be from Islamic extremists connected to or – just as importantly – inspired by al-Qa'ida.
Although many senior al-Qa'ida identities have been captured or killed, al-Qa'ida is resilient and continues to be influential in extremist circles.
Internet chat rooms, web forums and other sites facilitate the dissemination of extremist literature, videos and audio material and provide opportunities for perpetuating the single narrative of extremism and promoting a broader process of radicalisation – including of people in Australia.
In 2006, al-Qa'ida's media arm released 48 video statements – the most ever released in one year – underlining al-Qa'ida's role as a mobiliser and ideological driver of global jihad.
We know that extremists continue to plan attacks in a diverse range of countries around the globe with the objective of inflicting mass casualties and spreading fear;
Reporting in late January 2007 about alleged plans to kidnap a British Muslim soldier in the UK and execute him by beheading in what would be a low-budget but high impact operation shows just how innovative and imaginative extremists can be in devising attack scenarios.
Home-made explosives have featured in many of the planned or actual attacks and, with the tightening of controls on commercial explosives, we can expect to see further innovation in the use of this method.
We know that some extremists retain an interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear capabilities, but it is likely that they have some way to go before developing any such capability capable of causing mass casualties.
Within this broad context, the specific threat environment in each country is shaped by the local circumstances in terms of demography, political and foreign policy issues and a range of other factors.
While the Australian context may differ from the security situation in other countries, the threat to Australia and Australian interests cannot be considered in isolation.
Known extremists in Australia and those who may be on the path of radicalisation see themselves as part of a wider global phenomenon.
While the experience of each country has its unique features, there is a lot of similarity between what we have seen in Australia and that in UK, elsewhere in Europe and Canada.
Events elsewhere in the world resonate with extremists living within our community and may spur them into action with implications for the safety and security of Australians.
That is why intelligence and other agencies need to think about the challenges and opportunities before them in global terms and to learn from the experience of others.
In ASIO's case, the importance of our relationships with international liaison partners has never been greater and is an essential plank in our broader strategy of countering the threats we face.
In 2006, for the first time in several years, we did not see any mass casualty attacks outside Iraq that have been claimed by or reliably attributed to al-Qa'ida.
But a number of plots of varying significance were disrupted, including in Egypt (April), India (January, May and July – although there was a major attack in Mumbai in July), Jordan (March), Switzerland (May), Morocco (July and November), Pakistan (April), Turkey (April), the United States (June), Canada (June), the United Kingdom (June and August), and Denmark (September).
While the disruption of planned attacks may be reassuring at one level, the scope and scale of the planned attacks indicates that the general threat picture throughout many regions of the world remains bleak.
One view of the dimension of the problem was expressed succinctly by the head of the British Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller in November 2006 when she said that the British authorities are dealing with over 200 networks or groupings consisting of over 1600 individuals who are actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist attacks in the UK or abroad.
There was no suggestion that the problem was abating.
When you consider Dame Eliza's comments against the backdrop of global experience over the last decade, the range of potential targets and modes of attack that could be conducted, even if only some of these networks or groups were successful, is of real concern.
There have been successful, aborted or thwarted attacks against government buildings, diplomatic and consular offices, commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist facilities, residential compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation and oil and other energy and transport critical infrastructure.
We know that attacks against a large range of other targets from bridges to sporting stadia also have been considered.
While some plans for attacks may have proved impractical or beyond available resources at the time, they may be re-visited in the future, including by considering new and innovative approaches.
We know that terrorist groups have undertaken, trained for and considered a large variety of methodologies.
Methods of attack have included suicide car, truck, boat and plane bombings; assassination; missile attack and remote-control car and truck bombings; placed bombs and bombs carried and detonated by individuals.
Aviation has been a particular focus for al-Qa'ida with the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington the most dramatic use of aircraft for terrorist purposes to date.
The planned attacks in August 2006 using liquid explosives to destroy US-bound aircraft out of London's Heathrow airport, if they had been successful, would have rivalled the impact of 9/11 attacks.
This concept for an attack clearly remains attractive to jihadists:
In the mid 1990s similar attacks were planned involving multiple aircraft flying to the US from the Philippines.
In 2001 we saw Richard Reid's failed attempt to bomb a US airline using explosives concealed in his shoes.
Security measures that have been implemented since 2001 may make aviation-based attacks much harder to execute, but this sector remains attractive to al-Qa'ida.
The attacks on the rail networks of Madrid in March 2004, London in July 2005 and Mumbai in July 2006; and the bombing of restaurants and cafes in Bali in October 2002 and October 2005 demonstrate the continued willingness of terrorists to attack ‘soft' targets to cause mass casualties.
Mass urban transport facilities, particularly commuter rail networks, are favoured because they present a range of high-impact attack scenarios.
We know that terrorists view public transport systems as attractive targets because attacks can be mounted for low financial cost, they require only a small number of operatives and involve simple logistics.
Such attacks have the potential to achieve a number of objectives, including causing economic damage as well as striking fear and demoralising the wider population.
It is important to remember that attacks can be conceived and conducted on the basis of a particular scenario having a high probability of success, rather than necessarily on the strategic importance of a specific target.
Indeed, the ‘strategic significance' of terrorist targets may bear little relationship to the importance of the target to the broader society – the attack itself makes the target strategically significant.
Which makes ‘soft' targets highly vulnerable because they are easier to attack than well-secured, hardened targets.
That does not mean that all potential targets are equal and should attract the same level of resources in terms of preventative or protective measures – with limited resources we need to make sensible risk management decisions based on sound assessments of the threat.
Rail systems with extended layouts, multiple points of access, economic importance and the speed and ease with which attacks against them can be implemented have appealed to terrorists as we have seen in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005 and in Mumbai in 2006.
Ferry and bus systems have similar features in terms of multiple access points, large numbers of people and a lack of screening systems.
In 1997 an attempt was made to bomb the Sydney ferry, Narrabeen when an improvised explosive device was left under a seat but failed to explode.
This incident, along with a series of earlier bomb attacks on Sydney railway stations, was never resolved but serves to illustrate the feasibility of such attacks in an Australian context.
Large scale maritime targets also have proven to be attractive with attacks in the Persian Gulf, including against the USS Cole in 2000 and the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002, using explosive-laden small craft.
In 2004, members of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines planted an improvised explosive device on a ferry docked in Manila.
Some 90 minutes into the journey the device exploded killing 113 of the 899 people on board.
Australian diplomatic interests also are at threat.
The 9 September 2004 bomb attack outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta confirms this – as does the earlier planning by terrorists in Singapore to attack the Australian High Commission – and indicates a continuing willingness to attack ‘hard' targets.
More traditional forms of terrorist acts like assassinations and hostage taking have not disappeared.
Hostage taking was involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks as well as the Moscow theatre and Beslan school sieges and has become a feature of terrorism in Iraq.
Assassination is another low cost form of terrorism with a high degree of symbolic impact.
Targeted assassinations and armed assaults against Westerners have been adopted as a tactic in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East.
While there have been no instances so far of cyber attacks for terrorist purposes, hackers sympathetic to terrorist groups including al-Qa'ida have undertaken low-level cyber attacks including web-page defacement.
Clearly, the threat is multi-faceted, geographically disparate, persistent, responsive to counter-measures, and with terrorists willing to re-visit favoured concepts for attacks even when they have been unsuccessful previously.
With a variety of surface transport modes known to be favoured targets for terrorists around the world we need to adopt a holistic approach to countering the threat in Australia.
Simply increasing the protective security measures in place for one mode of transport, such as aviation, in isolation may increase the attractiveness of alternate targets which are more accessible and which offer greater chances of success.
Given that resources are limited and it is unrealistic to implement the same level of protective security for every facility or in every location, decisions about what is needed in each circumstance need to based on realistic assessments of the threat.
More broadly, counter-terrorism strategies in Australia, as with other countries, will require on-going adjustment as the threat of terrorism continues to evolve.
Protective measures require regular review and evaluation of their effectiveness against an increasingly sophisticated threat.
Terrorists' increasing ability to take counter-measures intended to make detection of their activities harder means we need to take deliberate steps to stay at the leading edge of technology and best practice.
As Australia's national security service, ASIO works closely with a range of Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies as well as international partners to identify the intentions and actions of that small minority of people who, if undetected or left unchecked, could mount attacks that would cause the death or injury of potentially large numbers of innocent people.
ASIO's investigations are directed at ensuring, as far as is possible, that we are able to detect at an early stage any indication of people planning to do harm to others and to prevent them from achieving their objective by using all lawful means available to us.
We are focussed on ensuring that our assessments and our thinking remain contemporary and relevant because an assessment may be valid at a point in time but things can change very quickly.
I have said previously that the threat we face is not static and continues to evolve.
Unfortunately that evolution is not in ways that bring clarity or definition to the task of countering the threat.
Indeed, there does not appear to be any linear progression in the development of the threat, nor any constraints on those who would seek to do harm to others.
The small scale of terrorist operations and the speed at which people can become intent on destruction is alarming.
As new sources of threat arise and the picture becomes more complex we cannot focus only on the latest development – traditional methods and targets still require our attention.
ASIO is committed to the timely dissemination of threat advice, assessments and other security intelligence to the relevant Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies, either through our Central Office in Canberra or via our offices around Australia.
In particular, where ASIO obtains specific and credible information about a threat we will disseminate that advice in the most expeditious manner available to us.
Underlying all that we do is the premise that the value of security intelligence lies in its ability to inform decision-making in ways that will enable the prevention of harm.
Let me conclude with the following comments.
Security intelligence has a central role to play in protecting the people of Australia and its interests by preventing harm before it can occur.
Performing this function will continue to involve complex and sensitive work.
We need to examine regularly our understanding of the threats we face to ensure that our perceptions are aligned with the reality we face.
We should neither underestimate the resourcefulness of extremists nor over-estimate the strength of our own position.
Nor should we lose sight of the importance of a coordinated, cooperative and consistent approach across all levels of government to countering the threats we face.
Thank you.