Address of ASIO Deputy Director-General
Security in Government Conference
Canberra, Tuesday 10 May 2005

• In this address I want to underline some of the key elements of the national security environment we now live in and outline ASIO's Threat Assessment role.
• I make no apologies for going over some of the information which some of you may consider you are familiar with.
• That is because the change has been quite fundamental and an understanding of the change and its implications is crucial. We also must resist the temptation to become complacent.
• The fundamental change is essentially this. In the past, we like most countries, when we thought of terrorism, thought in terms of protecting a small number of visiting overseas dignitaries each year and a small number of foreign diplomatic missions here that might be assessed at threat. More recently we have thought of terrorism in terms of protecting major international events such as the Olympics, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting or the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in Melbourne.
• We continue to do those things but there are now since 11 September two major differences
  • One - we have become a target in our own right both in Australia and overseas; and
  • Two - the new breed of transnational terrorists has broadened the target range way beyond diplomatic missions, dignitaries and special events to encompass a range of soft targets and a range of critical infrastructure.

Australia and Terrorism

• What are some of the key points in this fundamental change in the security environment for us?
  • To start with, terrorists, driven by an extreme interpretation of the Koran, have demonstrated a global capability and a willingness, almost preference for targeting innocent civilians; and where they can do this in the homeland of the 'infidels', they will;
• Australia and Australians have been 'legitimised' as terrorist targets by leaders such as Usama bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and more recently al Zarqawi.
• It was on 3 November 2001 that Usama bin Laden first 'legitimised' Australia as a specific terrorist target. Since then, Australia has been mentioned on eight separate occasions by bin Laden or his deputy, al Zawahiri or the terrorist leader in Iraq, al Zarqawi. We have also been mentioned in numerous website statements assessed to be genuinely linked to either al-Qa'ida or to al-Zarqawi. That does not include mention of Australia on several occasions by the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir.
• It is now clear that Australia has been part of al-Qa'ida's strategic vision for some years; well before our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and certainly before bin Laden's statement of 3 November 2001.
  • the investigation of JI in Australia led to Jack Roche in Perth and the identification of the aborted plot to attack Israeli diplomatic interests here in 2000;
  • during 2002 we were able to establish that al-Qa'ida's chief operational planner, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, had been issued with an Australian visa in August 2001. The visa, which was applied for by Khalid using a then unknown alias, had not been utilised and was cancelled. The only reasonable assumption is that Khalid was planning to come to Australia for some operational purpose;
  • from the debriefing of captured senior al-Qa'ida and Jemaah Islamiyah figures in 2002 and 2003 we know that attacks in Australia, over and above the ones I have already mentioned, were actively canvassed well before 11 September 2001.
• In the five years from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, there has been at least one aborted, disrupted or actual terrorist attack against us each year. This underlines the reality and persistence of the threat.
  • in 2000 we had the Jack Roche aborted plan already mentioned;
  • in late 2001 we had the disruption of planning for an attack in Singapore, including against the Australian High Commission;
  • on 12 October 2002 we had the attack in Bali;
  • in October 2003 we had the disruption of what we consider was planning for an attack here in Australia, involving the Frenchman, Willy Brigitte;
  • on 9 September 2004 we had the attack against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and
  • On 30 April 2005 Mr. Douglas Wood was kidnapped in Baghdad.
• In South East Asia, the Tsunami that so tragically affected parts of Indonesia and other countries did not lead to any fundamental re-think by terrorists. It is likely that, in Indonesia and elsewhere in South East Asia, they may have taken a tactical decision to lay off attacks in the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami. But we can be certain that the Tsunami has not resulted in any change of strategic direction.

Strategies

• We must expect that Australia and its overseas interests will continue to be targeted.
• What within its range of responsibilities is ASIO doing to seek to minimise the risk? Our aim is straightforward enough. It is to prevent terrorist attacks in Australia and against Australian interests overseas, and to prevent Australians from being involved in terrorism. In doing so, we work closely with the Police services and a wide range of other Government agencies and where necessary with the private sector.
• In broad terms, our strategies involve engagement with our international partners offshore, the prevention of people entering Australia assessed to be connected to terrorism, the identification of people in Australia committed to bin Laden's militant ideology, the identification of Australians who have undertaken terrorism training, the prevention of travel overseas by Australians assessed to be involved in terrorist activities, revamped laws and domestic counter-terrorism arrangements, and engagement with Australian Islamic communities.
• The task is not simple:
  • In seeking to identify Australians who have received terrorist training, ASIO has been working closely with the AFP and State and Territory police. It is work which has taken us to all continents but Antarctica. While the number is small in absolute terms, we continue to this day to identify Australians who have received terrorist training.
• Since 11 September 2001 17 people have been refused entry into Australia because of their assessed connections to terrorism.
• Where legally possible, we have sought to prevent the travel overseas of Australians assessed to have been involved with terrorism. Australian passports may be cancelled or denied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs following the issue of an adverse security assessment by ASIO to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
• Our objectives have also included the identification and, where lawful, the monitoring of individuals and groups in Australia committed to the militant ideology espoused by Usama bin Laden and his associates around the world.
• We have also assisted law enforcement agencies in investigations leading to the prosecution of alleged terrorism offences
  • to date, one Australian, Jack Roche in Perth, has been convicted and sentenced,
  • One in Sydney has been acquitted of a terrorist charge but convicted of threatening to harm a Commonwealth official, while
  • There are four others (three in Sydney and one in Melbourne) who are awaiting trial for alleged offences;
  • A small number of Australians are in custody overseas, (including David Hicks in Guantanamo Bay) either awaiting trial for alleged terrorism offences or because they are serving a sentence for a terrorism offence.
• The Australians who are either before the courts or who have been convicted, both here and overseas, range in age from 19 to late 40s, from Australian born to foreign born, from Caucasian to sub-Continent to Chinese and from labourer to university educated. What they do have in common, to varying degrees, is a commitment to the militant interpretation of the Koran espoused by the likes of bin Laden, his deputy al-Zawahiri, the terrorist leader in Iraq, al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakar Bashir.
• Perhaps no one person better illustrates the global nature of the challenge than Willy Brigitte; born in the Caribbean, introduced to militant Islam in France, trained as a terrorist in Pakistan, Brigitte came to Australia to carry out a terrorist attack. And, but for the cooperative work of the French authorities, ASIO, the AFP and the NSW Police, he may have succeeded.
• The challenge will be with us for a long time.

Threat Assessments

• Amongst ASIO's counter terrorism responsibilities is the collection and assessment of intelligence and the dissemination of that intelligence to appropriate bodies, such as PSCC, Customs, DIMIA, the Department of Transport and Regional Services and of course the AFP and State and Territory Police. Central to our role is the provision of threat assessments.
• They are provided through the National Threat Assessment Centre in Canberra, a multi agency body located in ASIO's central office which completed its first year of 24-hour operation on 3 May 2005.
• Because threat assessments and threat levels are a key point at which intelligence intersects with other Government business and with the private sector, it is worth noting:
  • formal threat levels are part of ASIO's statutory responsibilities
    • Ministers do not set threat levels, but are advised of them
  • in making judgements about threat levels, the Director-General of Security is obliged under legislation to ensure that such judgements are based solely on matters relevant to security, and are independent of other considerations or interests;
  • ASIO's role is advisory. We do not have enforcement functions, and it is a matter for others to take action in response to our advice;
  • while ASIO and others can be consulted, it is up to Government to determine what is conveyed to the Australian public flowing from the threat assessments.
• Also, it is important to distinguish between ASIO's role in setting formal threat levels, both here in Australia and for Australian interests overseas, and the broader public debates about the threat of terrorism.
• We could not raise the formal threat level in Australia or elsewhere simply on the basis that a majority of people believed a particular development or statement or policy approach made us more at threat
  • those debates in the public arena are understandable and important and totally legitimate within their own framework. But they are separate to ASIO's role in setting formal threat levels, which are shaped by the information available to ASIO from all sources and which must meet transparent definitional requirements.
• In summary, I want to leave you with the following messages:
  • we live in a heightened threat environment which is not going to change for quite some time;
  • it is an environment in which we all need to work cooperatively together within Government and between Government and the private sector. We need each other and communication and occasions like this are central to the development of informed players and to the development of the necessary trust and confidence;
  • we should not be spooked by the challenge. As we saw after 11 September, today's economy is remarkably resilient. With the right mix of perspective, perseverance and resolve, Australians are also well placed, both as a people and as a country, to meet the challenge. And we saw this after both Bali and the attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta last year.
• Over and above our own national character we are a robust democracy, supportive and tolerant of diversity. And tolerance and understanding of religious and other differences complements the uncompromising approach which, I believe, must be taken to terrorism.