Safeguarding Australia Conference 2005
Extending National Security Intelligence
Address by
First Assistant Director-General, Security Division, ASIO
Tuesday 12 July 2005, 12.15 - 12.45pm
Introduction
In this address I want to:
underline some of the key elements of the national security environment we now live in;
outline how ASIO has responded to this environment, specifically through:
its enhanced threat assessment role, and
increased engagement with business and the owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
National Security Environment
The national security environment we now live in has fundamentally changed. An understanding of this change and its implications is crucial, as is the need to avoid complacency as was so tragically underlined by the attacks in London last Thursday (7 July).
The fundamental change is essentially this. Before 2000, we, like most countries, thought of terrorism in terms of protecting:
a small number of visiting overseas dignitaries each year, and
a small number of foreign diplomatic missions here that might be assessed at threat.
We then thought of terrorism in terms of protecting major international events such as the Olympics, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, or the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in Melbourne.
But then, as we all know, there was 11 September 2001. This had a huge effect on the way governments work right around the world. And for Australia, it was all reinforced by 12 October 2002.
We continue to protect visiting overseas dignitaries and diplomatic missions here. But there are now two major differences:
One:
we have become a target in our own right, both in Australia and overseas; and
Two:
the new breed of transnational terrorists has broadened the target range way beyond diplomatic missions, dignitaries and special events to encompass a range of soft targets and a range of critical infrastructure - including, as we have again been tragically reminded, public transport systems.
So what are some of the key points in this fundamental change in the security environment?
To start with, terrorists, driven by an extreme interpretation of the Koran, have demonstrated a global capability and a willingness, almost a preference, for targeting innocent civilians. And where they can do this in the homeland of the 'infidels', they will.
Australia and Australians have been 'legitimised' as terrorist targets by leaders such as Usama bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and more recently al- Zarqawi.
It was on 3 November 2001 that Usama bin Laden first 'legitimised' Australia as a specific terrorist target.
Since then, Australia has been mentioned on eight separate occasions by bin Laden or his deputy, al Zawahiri or the terrorist leader in Iraq, al Zarqawi.
We have also been mentioned in numerous website statements assessed to be genuinely linked to either al-Qa'ida or al-Zarqawi.
That does not include mention of Australia on several occasions by the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir.
It is now clear that Australia has been part of al-Qa'ida's strategic vision for some years - well before our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and certainly before bin Laden's statement of 3 November 2001.
In 2000, the investigation of JI in Australia led to Jack Roche in Perth and the identification of the aborted plot to attack Israeli diplomatic interests here.
In 2002, we established that al-Qa'ida's chief operational planner, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, had been issued with an Australian visa in August 2001. The visa, which was applied for by Khalid using a then unknown alias, had not been utilised and was cancelled.
The only reasonable assumption is that Khalid was planning to come to Australia for some operational purpose.
From the debriefing of captured senior al-Qa'ida and Jemaah Islamiyah figures in 2002 and 2003, we know that attacks in Australia, over and above the ones I have already mentioned, were actively canvassed well before 11 September 2001.
In the years from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, there has been at least one aborted, disrupted or actual terrorist attack against us each year. This underlines the reality and persistence of the threat.
In 2000, we had the Jack Roche aborted plan I have already mentioned.
In late 2001, we had the disruption of planning for an attack in Singapore, including against the Australian High Commission.
On 12 October 2002, we had the attack in Bali.
In October 2003, we had the disruption of what we consider was planning for an attack here in Australia involving the Frenchman, Willy Brigitte.
On 9 September 2004, we had the attack against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. And
In January 2005 there were attacks on our Embassy protection force in Baghdad
In South East Asia, the tsunami that so tragically affected parts of Indonesia and other countries did not lead to any fundamental re-think by terrorists. It is likely that, in Indonesia and elsewhere in South East Asia, they may have taken a tactical decision to lay off attacks in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. But we can be certain that the tsunami has not resulted in any change of strategic direction.
We must expect that Australia and its overseas interests will continue to be targeted.
So what within its range of responsibilities is ASIO doing to seek to minimise the risk? Our aim is straightforward enough:
It is to prevent terrorist attacks in Australia and against Australian interests overseas, and to prevent Australians from being involved in terrorism.
In doing so, we work closely with the police services and a wide range of other Government agencies, and where necessary, the private sector.
Among ASIO's counter terrorism responsibilities is the collection and assessment of intelligence, and the dissemination of that intelligence to appropriate bodies, such as:
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
the Protective Security Coordination Centre
Customs
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
the Department of Transport and Regional Services
and of course the AFP and State and Territory Police.
Counter-terrorism is now a central policy priority, with flow-on effects for the way agencies work together, both within governments and between governments.
And as with any issue that becomes a major government priority, a lot more players have a legitimate place at the table, with cooperation central to success.
One key element in cooperation and success is intelligence sharing. This is not something new - intelligence sharing between agencies, both nationally and internationally, goes back a long way. For instance:
S17 of the ASIO Act of 1979 authorises ASIO to pass information to other agencies, including Federal and State police, for purposes relevant to security.
S18 authorises the passing of information obtained by ASIO to the police where it relates to an indictable offence.
And under S19 of the Act, ASIO may cooperate - including exchanging intelligence - with foreign agencies as approved by the Attorney-General.
ASIO liaises with 266 organisations in 112 countries on matters of mutual security interest. These liaison relationships provide valuable, and at times unique, insights into matters of direct security relevance to Australia.
So, if intelligence sharing per se is not new, what has changed since 11 September?
Perhaps the most important change has been a much sharper awareness in the community of the threat of terrorism.
This has driven an invigorated expectation - and a very reasonable one - that taxpayer-funded agencies work cooperatively together to maximise public safety.
And this has reinforced what has always been the expectation of Parliament and Government.
Today, more people than ever before are working in the counter-terrorism arena. No longer is counter-terrorism the domain of the Australian Intelligence Community, the police and academics. Now, it is a whole-of-government issue.
An important example of information sharing is ASIO's role in the provision of threat assessments. Threat assessments are in increased demand as a direct result of today's security environment for two major reasons:
because of their relevance to a wider range of government planning and activity
and because security needs to be factored not just into short-term planning, but also medium and long term.
This increased demand has led to the establishment of the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC). The NTAC is a dedicated 24/7 multi-agency body located in ASIO's Central Office in Canberra. It completed its first year of 24 hour operation on 3 May 2005.
The NTAC's threat assessments:
inform government decision making about security measures
form a basis for determining the national counter-terrorism alert level, and
are used by DFAT in preparing travel advisories.
Vital to the NTAC's success is its multi-agency composition.
In addition to ASIO, other members of the Australian Intelligence Community, the Australian Federal Police, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Transport and Regional Services contribute staff.
There is also the capacity to involve other agencies if appropriate.
Threat assessments and threat levels are a key point at which intelligence intersects with other Government business and with the private sector. So it is worth noting:
Formal threat levels are part of ASIO's statutory responsibilities.
Ministers do not set threat levels, but are advised of them.
In making judgements about threat levels, the Director-General of Security is obliged under legislation to ensure such judgements are based solely on matters relevant to security, and are independent of other considerations or interests.
ASIO's role is advisory. We do not have enforcement functions, and it is a matter for others to take action in response to our advice.
While ASIO and others can be consulted, it is up to Government to determine what is conveyed to the Australian public flowing from the threat assessments.
Also, it is important to distinguish between ASIO's role in setting formal threat levels, both here in Australia and for Australian interests overseas, and the broader public debates about the threat of terrorism.
We could not raise the formal threat level in Australia or elsewhere simply on the basis that a majority of people believed a particular development or statement or policy approach made us more at threat.
Those debates in the public arena are understandable, important and totally legitimate within their own framework.
But they are separate to ASIO's role in setting formal threat levels, which are shaped by the information available to ASIO from all sources and which must meet transparent definitional requirements.
Critical infrastructure
As I mentioned earlier, today's transnational terrorists have extended their target range beyond the traditional to include soft targets and a range of critical infrastructure.
And so ASIO has extended the range of its threat assessments.
ASIO's Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate consults widely with both government and industry in order to undertake threat assessments on Australia's critical infrastructure. These threat assessments can be either asset-specific, or for an industry sector (such as the transport or energy sector).
To protect our critical infrastructure, ASIO and industry need information from each other.
Industry members are experts in their field, and ASIO needs their advice on industry operations.
And at the same time, industry members need ASIO to provide accurate and timely information about the security environment in order to adopt appropriate risk mitigation strategies.
ASIO's interaction with the private sector has increased significantly over the last four years.
To enhance it further, the Government has announced it will establish a Business Liaison Unit within ASIO. It will be a focal point for business contact so that owners/operators of critical infrastructure and other members of the business community can access timely advice on matters affecting the security of their assets and staff.
The former Director-General of ASIO provided briefings on the current security environment to ministerial councils in the portfolios of primary industries, transport, minerals and resources, attorneys-general and police. Similarly, ASIO's Deputy Director-General has provided briefings to meetings of senior officials in the portfolios of transport, primary industries, treasury, health and emergency services.
This reflects the importance ASIO places on the sharing of information, the protection of critical infrastructure, and public safety.
Conclusion
In summary, I want to leave you with the following messages:
We live in a heightened threat environment that is not going to change for quite some time.
It is an environment in which we all need to work together - within Government, and between Government and the private sector. We need each other.
Communication and occasions like this conference are central to the development of informed players and to the development of the necessary trust and confidence.
We should not be knocked off balance by the challenge. As we saw after 11 September, today's economy is remarkably resilient. With the right mix of perspective, perseverance and resolve, Australians are also well placed, both as a people and as a country, to meet the challenge. We saw this after both Bali and the attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta last year.
Over and above our own national character we are a robust democracy, supportive and tolerant of diversity. Tolerance and understanding of religious and other differences complement the uncompromising approach which, I believe, must be taken to terrorism.