Director-General's Address
CEW Bean Foundation
1 November 2006
National Security and the Media

• Thank you Mr Chairman for inviting me to address the members of the CEW Bean Foundation this evening.
• In 2005 we commemorated the 90th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli on 25th April 1915.
• Thousands of Australians, New Zealanders and others had made more than a physical journey to a remote beach in a foreign country.
• For many, it was an emotional pilgrimage to a place where an earlier generation of Australians helped to define the qualities we hold dear as a nation.
• I was fortunate to be there that morning in the chill of the pre-dawn light, to witness the sun rise into clear blue skies and to reflect on just how different things had been all those years ago.
• Our appreciation of what went on at Gallipoli in 1915 and later on the Western Front, in no small measure is attributable to the work of Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean.
• While I do not profess to be an expert on Charles Bean, I'm sure that everyone in this room will agree with me when I say he left an indelible mark on the public life of the nation:
• First, in his role as official government correspondent during the First World War when he witnessed the dramatic events of Gallipoli and the horrors of trench warfare on the Western Front.
• Second, as official historian of Australia's involvement during this war, culminating in the monumental Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, the first two volumes of which, as many of you would know, were prepared not far from here at the Tuggeranong Homestead;
• And finally, by cementing the significance of the ANZAC story in the public psyche of the nation, not least by working to ensure the foundation of the War Memorial in Canberra.
• As a chronicler of war, Bean's practical concern to bridge war as strategy and war as lived experience, places him in a line of writers going back to Thucydides.
• From my own perspective, there are three things that strike me about Bean's approach to the craft of the correspondent:
• His manner and method of reportage;
• His sensitive and generally sensible handling of the correspondent's dilemma; and
• His strategic grasp of the meaning and significance of the events he witnessed for the troops involved and for the nation they represented and ultimately helped to define.
• This evening I would like to explore these qualities and principles and offer my perspectives on how they are just as applicable to - and I am pleased to say, just as apparent in -the professional and considered reporting of contemporary correspondents.

• Charles Bean arrived at Gallipoli on the morning of 25 April 1915 after being selected by his journalist peers to be Australia's official war correspondent.
• Once at Gallipoli and subsequently on the Western Front, the autonomy afforded to Bean was unique and gave him an opportunity to develop an unprecedented appreciation of the war in terms of both its military and personal dimensions.
• In Keith Murdoch's words:

'No account of actions could be more accurate than his ... He is always in the place where he can see and help most, however dangerous it may be'.

• In fact, Bean was shot in the knee on one occasion and was lucky not to be killed on others. This proximity to the action allowed Bean to produce intimate, detailed reporting that captured the minutiae of war and the pivotal moments of battle - in his own words, the very:

'details as to the life, scenes, bearing of men ... scenes that will stir Australian pride'.

• While admiring of his fellow correspondents, Bean tended to avoid their effusive, sometimes fulsome, praise of the troops, such as Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett's - that reputable and double-barrelled Englishman - who described the ANZACs as a 'race of athletes.'
• As Bean wrote,

'War correspondents have so habitually exaggerated the heroism of battles that people don't realise that the real actions are heroic.'

• This significant point seemed lost on sections of the print media back home, which tended to favour more sensationalist stories, often by journalists not even at Gallipoli, over Bean's depictions of ANZACs responding to battle in real but heroic ways.
• Indeed, Bean's refusal to exaggerate his copy meant that the Age and the Argus eventually decided to stop running his Gallipoli dispatches just five months into the campaign.
• It is a nice historical irony that, despite the short-term focus of some sections of the print media of the time and their refusal to publish his work, Bean's endeavours gave rise to insights about the national character that have endured to this day.
• Some years later, when writing the Official History, Bean distilled his observations in the following words:

'These qualities of independence, originality, the faculty of rising to an occasion, and loyalty to a 'mate', conspicuous in the individual Australian, became recognisable as parts of the national character.'
'Not', he elaborated, 'that either the British people or the Australians themselves realised fully before the war that an Australian national character or even a nation existed.

• Bean was no jingoist. He was, to borrow Professor Inglis' phrase, a 'disinterested patriot'.
• Indeed, Bean had observed and written about examples of bad behaviour during the ANZAC's pre-deployment in Egypt.
• He had seen men run from battle.
• And he knew that, contrary to mythology, injured soldiers in field hospitals rarely, if ever, wanted to go back to the front line.
• But, having witnessed modern, mass casualty warfare, Bean thought it was in the overcoming, rather than in the denial, of its realities that ordinary men performed heroic feats.

• Bean's close engagement on the ground and commitment to his craft earned him wide-ranging respect.
• It also gave him a unique perspective on the military strategy and tactics of the Allies and a first-hand appreciation of the state of play.
• Given this commitment to detailed, accurate reportage, how did Bean deal with military censorship?
• Bean's record, together with his reflections on the issue in his diary, reveals a sensitive and generally sensible handling of this dilemma.
• No fool, he was as aware as anyone of the mistakes and mishaps of the campaign and noted in his diary:

'the people of any modern state worth living in will require some sort of information at least partly independent of their generals and general staffs as to what is happening.'

• But he also was strongly committed to correspondence as reportage rather than commentary, criticism or, for that matter, cynicism.
• To my knowledge, while at Gallipoli Bean wasn't tempted to 'speak truth to power' in the manner of his compatriot Keith Murdoch, and the English correspondent, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett; or to circumvent official channels in the name of 'speaking truth' to the wider world.
• One occasion when Bean did transgress his own principles - when he, together with Will Dyson and Keith Murdoch, tried in May 1918 to prevent the appointment of John Monash as Commander of the Australian troops - was ill-considered and, far from 'speaking truth to power', left the Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, misinformed and confused.
• As Bean later reflected, the incident was:

'strong proof that in wartime administration ... it is better to let [a decision] be worked out than to risk confusion by immediately ayttempting to have it changed.'

• Bean's overall approach to war correspondence was based on his conviction that war wasn't run by correspondents, who weren't always privy to forward military strategy or operational planning, nor paid to second-guess those responsible for making decisions that affected the lives of the troops.
• Yes, correspondents had access to decision makers, and were privy to certain sensitive information - the sort of information that made for great copy.
• But, despite this limited entrée into the world of military officialdom, they still lacked the larger picture, and access to all the information available to those making the decisions about deployments, tactics and the like.
• As such, the correspondent always risked compromising operations, and endangering lives by unwittingly disclosing potentially significant information to the opponent.
• Bean's understanding of this dilemma informed all aspects of his conduct as a correspondent and goes to the root of the close working relationship he formed with the military censor.
• In his own words:

'The correspondent ... has to take very great care not to write matter which may be valuable to the enemy even though the censor might not realise it.'
'A change of date or place (which is immaterial to the facts related) sometimes makes it safe to relate facts which if given with the true date and place would be dangerous.'

• There were even times in war, 'when the publication of news could become so risky that it is best suppressed altogether.'
• Ever human though, and ever the journalist, even Bean was susceptible to the lure of the great story.
• He was sure, for instance, that the innovative withdrawal of the troops from Gallipoli in December 1915 would stir Australian pride and regarded his draft as his 'best article of the campaign'.
• So, when the censor refused Bean permission to file his copy because it would give away the methods by which the troops had been withdrawn, he described the decision as similar to taking 'unexpected shrapnel shell in the pit of the stomach'.
• To me, though, it is a mark of both the man and the correspondent that Bean saw beyond his personal disappointment, recording in his diary that the decision was 'quite right', given that the military command knew what was planned for the remaining troops at Helles, whereas he did not.

• In helping to cement the ANZAC story in the public life of the nation, Charles Bean did more than eulogise their achievement and sacrifice.
• He articulated clearly what they had fought for and why Australians, despite the heavy losses and significant toll the war had on soldiers and their families, should regard their country's involvement as necessary and honourable.
• Bean's concise analysis of the international situation leading up to the war and its relevance to Australia's national interest was directed squarely at those committed to a policy of isolationism.
• In his own words:

'The high-minded and progressive men who were among the early leaders in most of the colonies often nursed the vague hope that their virgin communities would be able to seclude themselves from the world, living without concern in its disputes, freed by their isolation from the dangers of war or the need for army or navy.'

• Against this position, Bean advanced five key insights:
• First, Australia increasingly was part of, and therefore intimately affected by, developing systems of international trade, transport and communications.
• Second, Australia was not secure from hostile powers because of its geographic isolation, but because it enjoyed the protection of the British navy.
• Third, the reach of European, and therefore potentially hostile powers, extended into the Pacific theatre; and hence any outbreak of war in Europe would have significant reverberations for Australia.
• Fourth, as a newly formed small nation, Australia could 'not afford the indifference which sometimes comes with strength'.
• And last, there was a fundamental difference between the two main global powers - the British empire (at least in respect of its principal offshoots) was 'of the very essence of liberty'; whereas the nascent German empire was militaristic, rigid and calculating.
• So while Australia had no direct involvement in the events precipitating hostilities, and could do little to shape the course of events through diplomacy, Bean saw how intimately the national interest was entwined in the outcome of the war, and the international order that would subsequently be established.
• Turning now to the Gallipoli campaign itself - the pros and cons of which continue to be debated - Bean was careful to record for posterity that the ANZACs hadn't been sent to fight a battle of little strategic significance.
• To the contrary, the campaign for the Dardanelles was seen as one way to break the stalemate on the Western Front.
• This theatre was regarded as a key strategic asset and vulnerability for the Central Powers; in Bean's words, it was:

'... the point where the far-extended arm of the enemy was preventing Britain and France from assisting their great ally Russia, and from which, instead, Germany herself was likely to reach out for her most cherished objectives - Baghdad and the way to Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, and the farther East.'

• It is worth pointing out that the Central Powers appeared to be of similar view. As an aide to the German General Liman von Sanders later wrote of the 'Battle of Sari Bair', had:

'...this operation been successful, the way to Constantinople would have been open; [and] hard-pressed Russia could have received the longed-for help by way of the Black Sea...'

• Charles Bean belonged to a generation whose hopes that the Great War would be the 'war to end all wars' faded quickly, as defeated Germany succumbed to militant fascism, and Russia became the global hub of expansionist communism.
• Casting our minds back to his times in this way, we might ask ourselves how future generations will judge us - for we, too, might be seen as a generation whose hopes for enduring stability post-Cold war, have been unsettled by the rise of significant new threats.
• Indeed, the international environment has changed substantially since the collapse of Soviet communism.
• While traditional threats to national security - that is to say, hostile or mutually suspicious states or alliances of states - remain in play, the post cold war environment has also seen the rapid, and in part unpredicted, rise of non-traditional sources of threat.
• The most significant development has been the rise of militant Islamism - which took shape particularly during the 90s when non-state groups and networks such as al-Qa'ida aggressively began to define themselves as a movement with global intent and scope.
• And while the Middle East is the cradle of militant Islamism, its reach now extends through Europe, Asia, the Americas and Australia.
• The present security environment therefore looks considerably different to the world envisaged by theorists such as Francis Fukiyama in the early 1990s.
• Writing in the tradition of European idealism, Fukiyama argued that history's arrow pointed toward the global embrace of Western-style liberal democracy, and spoke of the 'end of history'.
• But 'history knows no resting places and has no plateaux'; and this cosmopolitan ideal has proven elusive for the international system of states, and has been radically challenged by militant non-state actors.
• Nor are the dynamics of the current international environment captured by a so-called 'clash of civilisations'.
• Without doubt, the promotion by militant Islamists of an ideology characterised by the 'duty' of an enduring and necessarily violent struggle against the West is the very essence of an illiberal and anti-democratic world view.
• But militant Islamism is an ideology without majority support.
• And militant Islamists continue to carry out violent attacks against their own national peoples.
• In this new security environment, Australia's national interest lies in an international order that is stable, and favourable to freedom, prosperity and democracy.
• And in pursuing its goals, Australia has, and will continue to forge, strong relationships with peoples and countries both within the region and beyond.
• But there is no simple or single formula for combating terrorism as an ideology or as a structure.
• Security is not geographically confined to the Australian mainland, and our protective efforts extend to wherever attacks occur, or may occur.
• So our security is not and cannot be predicated on one particular theatre or region.
• In a very real sense, Australia's security goals lock into a broader set of regional and global goals, challenges, and achievements, including:
• strengthening our bilateral ties with the United States;
• greater engagement with North Asia;
• active engagement in the Pacific, including providing assistance to these nations so, over time, they can build and maintain effective state and societal institutions; and
• and building better relations with moderate Islamic countries within and beyond the immediate region.

• Running parallel to this evolving security environment has been the unprecedented expansion of the media's capability and reach.
• As I'm sure you are all too aware, the super charged media cycle sometimes demands immediate and easy answers to issues that are enduring and weighty.
• So let me now offer some observations on what I see as the legacy of Charles Bean for a contemporary media operating in the complex security environment of the early 21st Century.
• In one sense, Charles Bean was a traveller on a journey where one of the destinations was a sense of national identity that had not existed previously.
• We could also see our own recent experience as a journey where, as a nation, Australians have had to confront the reality of the threat of terrorism and respond in ways that are unprecedented in many areas, including our security intelligence, our law enforcement capacity, our legislative framework and our judicial processes.

• At its simplest level it means that agencies like ASIO must perform increasingly difficult and sensitive work if we are to meet our responsibilities.
• And, just as Bean found, there are challenges for the media in how it covers the events and issues, particularly in connection with the work undertaken by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

• Of course, in an enduring and robust parliamentary democracy like Australia, it is right and proper that the media takes an interest in the activities of such agencies.
• And, I am pleased to say, that most of the recent reporting about security intelligence matters has been very professional and has provided a largely accurate and realistic picture of the role and work of ASIO.

• I acknowledge the professionalism displayed by journalists, some of whom are present here tonight, and believe that such reportage does indeed serve the nation well.

• Nevertheless, there will always be limitations on what can be revealed publicly about the work of ASIO, much of which must be done discreetly and out of the glare of the media spotlight if it is to be effective.
• But, while most of ASIO's activities are not, and cannot be, fully transparent, our work is, and will continue to be, fully accountable.
• There are strong oversight arrangements in place to provide an independent assurance that the Organisation is accountable for its activities.
• ASIO is accountable to the Attorney-General, who is active and rigorous in his oversight; to the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security; and to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
• In addition, ASIO tables an unclassified annual Report to Parliament - one of very few intelligence agencies around the world to do so.
• In the present security environment, there are new dimensions to ASIO's work that have made quite challenging demands on the Organisation.

• For instance, the judiciary and courts continue to work through the difficult issues surrounding the use of intelligence in court proceedings to find solutions that are consistent with both core legal principles - including the right of an accused person to a fair trial - and the requirements of security and the public interest in the protection of national security.

• I would like to close with the following observations - observations that bring us back to Bean's legacy as a correspondent and as a disinterested observer of the evolving national identity.
• Under our system, the national interest is not located exclusively in any single institution - whether the media, ASIO, or some other department of state.
• Healthy liberal democracies work because key institutions are capable of pursuing different agendas, while exhibiting a certain degree of self-restraint and mutual regard.
• More broadly, healthy liberal democracies require all individuals and groups to exercise self-restraint and mutual tolerance, and to frame their conduct within the spirit and letter of the law.
• As the nation moves into the 21st century, the challenge is to ensure our evolving national identity continues to embrace a shared set of values:

• Values that allow our liberal democracy to continue to work and underpin a successful, prosperous Australia.

• In giving effect to these principles and ideals, and in defining and refining the values that maintain our system of government, we could do worse than look to the example of Charles Bean, and of the young Australians who, for him, had laid the foundation for our national identity and whose sacrifices continue to 'stir Australian pride.'
• Thank you.