Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Director-General's Address
'Strategy and Geography in the Current Security Environment'
20 June 2007

• Good afternoon.
• It is a pleasure to be here today and to have an opportunity to address the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
  • I represented the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the board of ASPI in 2003, and so was able to see first hand the calibre of the thinking it brings to significant matters of public policy.
  • I think it important also to acknowledge that today's venue, the Hilton Hotel, was the scene of a terrorist attack on 13 February 1978 when a bomb inside a garbage truck exploded, killing three people and injuring another eight.
• 'The policy of a state', Napoleon once remarked, 'lies in its geography.'
  • Napoleon, of course, continued to exhibit a keen interest in geography throughout his reign.
  • Particularly that possessed by other states.
• I draw attention to his remark, not lightly, but because it captures the essence of some fundamental challenges for Australia and other states in the current global security environment.
• Australia's geography has exercised and shaped our strategic thinking. As a nation, we have had discussions about:
  • the implications of our unique continental geography for our military defence;
  • the 'tyranny' versus the 'advantage' of distance; and
  • the well-being and stability of our region being a pre-requisite for our security and prosperity.
• Over the years, our fear of a hostile military invasion has dissipated.
• Questions of territorial integrity - of the link between geography and policy - now more likely concern the 'extra-geographic' influence of non-state actors and other types of change:
  • that is, the globalisation of communications, commerce and cargo that is integrating, piecemeal, large areas of the world.
• In the broader sweep of history, this type of observation is not especially new.
  • For example, our own distinguished military historian, Charles Bean, wrote about how the development of 'swift transport', 'international trade' and 'relations with the world' broke the isolationist strain in Australia's foreign policy debates leading up to the First World War.
• What is new in contemporary discussion is the idea that globalising forces are dissolving the fundamental matrix between national sovereignty, territory, and security:
  • that geography and policy are being wrestled out of the hands not just of Australia, but of all states.
• It is against that backdrop that I would like to share with you some thoughts about our current security environment.
• Within that environment there are conflicting trends that require careful consideration and active management.
• Some of the forces at work can be unsettling for those who are tied to traditional ways of thinking about geography and policy.
• Globalists, for instance, sometimes talk as though geography is no longer territorial, and the nation-state is on its last legs.
  • Yet the geopolitical world is still very much territorial and state-centred.
  • In fact, the last half century has seen the rise, not the demise, of the nation-state within the international system.
• Traditionalists sometimes talk as though it is business as usual for geography, policy and statecraft.
  • Yet this view disregards the accelerating growth and the significance of the trans-national, non-state sphere.
• 'Idealists' and 'realists' debated the character of the international arena for much of the 20th century, but the reality is more complex than the terms of this debate usually allow.

• At the beginning of the twentieth century, the political world was populated by empires, colonies, protectorates, as well as a great diversity of states.
  • Of course, very few of these actors were liberal or democratic.
• By century's close, the international system had become, with a few exceptions, a system of states.
• Far from its eclipse, the second half of the twentieth century saw the consolidation of the nation-state as the main type of political organisation.
• Indeed, there are now more recognised nation-states than ever before.
  • Between 1950 and the beginning of the 21st century, the number of nation-states increased from around 70 to just over 190.
  • And since 1990, over 30 new states have been recognised by the international community.
• But numbers alone can be misleading. If we ask what lies behind this global trend, no uniform pattern jumps to mind.
  • During the last century, states have formed, reformed or vanished in the crucible of wars, great and small, revolutions, coups d'état, occupations, withdrawals, independence movements, as well as peaceful processes leading to fundamental constitutional change.
• There has been some movement toward liberal democracy.
• There also has been some movement toward political stability - either separately or in conjunction with liberal democracy.
• But even the euphoria associated with the end of the Cold War was short-lived.
• We should be wary of assuming the overall direction is to increasing stability.
• History is less a sequence of moves toward a Fukiyama-like end-game, than it is a clearing house for malign and debilitating, as well as constructive and peaceful, forces.
  • Since 1990 (and the list is indicative only), civil and inter-state conflict has taken place in Algeria, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Yemen, the Congo, Chechnya, as well as war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, India and Pakistan, and in Afghanistan and Iraq.
  • And last year, there was war between Hizballah (a non-state actor) and Israel.
• Indeed, the complexion of the 190 or so states is variegated, in some cases deeply.
  • Some states have recovered from conflict or made the transition to independence with remarkable ease.
  • Some have been captured by partisan interests and used to pursue malign and bloody ends, both within and across territorial borders.
  • Others struggle to fulfil basic tasks, or to fully secure their territory and population.
• So while the international system has evolved into a system of states, the gap between developed and undeveloped or functional and dysfunctional political systems is real, and is likely to affect the strategic environment for some time to come.

• Advanced democracies like Australia enjoy the benefits of an evolved 'political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government'.
• Yet some globalists say the strategic benefit of internal stability is offset increasingly by cross-border dynamics driven, on the whole, by non-state actors and other forces.
• Doubtless, the domestic and international spheres have evolved high levels of inter-connectivity and inter-dependence.
• In some cases, this has extended a sustained evolution of interstate trade and concourse taking place over hundreds of years.
  • In others, the pace of change and progress has accelerated rapidly in the last generation.
• In a relatively short period of time, we've witnessed:
  • increased flows of capital between nations;
  • a rapid rise of global communications and media technologies, and greater capacity to move people and cargo around the world;
  • larger numbers of people crossing borders as migrants, refugees, workers, or tourists; and
  • an expanding internet, which has made possible exponential growth in information flows.
• Activity spanning geographical boundaries is becoming broader and richer.
• In addition to commerce, communications and cargo, there are burgeoning numbers of trans-national, non-government organisations - ranging from international humanitarian and aid, to policy organisations, together with a spectrum of issue motivated groups.
  • High profile organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, the International Crisis Group, Freedom House, Amnesty International and the Red Cross are only the tip of the iceberg.
  • In fact, some estimate the number of trans-national NGOs to be in excess of 60,000.
• Not all countries have managed these changes well.
  • Culture shock has accompanied economic growth and liberalisation.
• Australia has benefited from, and contributed significantly to, a globalising world.
• However, some say the cost is diminished territorial integrity.
• In my view, this is not so.
  • It also misses the point that the challenges from globalisation flow outward as much as inward.
• Increased cross-border activity has created new challenges for domestic security - border control being the most obvious example.
• But just as significant is the increasing internationalisation and diversification of Australian interests, the number of Australians and Australian companies operating abroad, and the 'export' of Australian perspectives.
• How does a middle-power with impressive international influence, but limited strategic reach, support and protect the diverse activity and interests of Australians outside our continental geography?
  • While responsible for countering threats whether they are 'directed from, or committed within, Australia or not', ASIO can provide only one dimension to solutions to this complex problem.
  • But it is the sort of challenging issue we deal with on a daily basis.
• I would like to make one more point about globalisation.
• The evolution of the trans-national, non-state sphere has produced a vibrant, horizontal 'network culture' operating with, alongside, or completely independently of, states.
• This is changing people's perspectives, and the context in which they understand problems and issues, and see opportunities.
  • You will recall the catchcry from the 1990s, 'Think globally, act locally'.
• But the trans-national, non-state sphere is also capable of producing 'pathologies' - that is to say, networks channelling their energies against states, civilians or the international system as a whole.
  • Trans-national criminal networks are one example.
  • Trans-national terrorist networks, another.

• The international environment has changed substantially since the collapse of Soviet Communism.
• This is sometimes described as a shift from a 'bipolar' to a 'unipolar' world.
• The reality is more complex, though, and not quite so neat.
• There is now a kind of 'pluriverse' of political, cultural and ideological forces, coexisting with, and at times challenging, a 'universe' shaped by US primacy.
• This makes for a strategically unfamiliar and, in many ways, unpredictable global environment.
• Samuel Huntington tended to over-generalise and over-state the matter when he said that the world is now multi-polar and prone to clash because it is structured by variant civilisations.
  • The dynamics of the international environment are not captured by a so-called 'clash of civilisations'.
  • Nor are they anchored firmly in a set of political or cultural norms that transcend difference.
• Managing and accommodating political difference is the bread and butter of statecraft, diplomacy and international law.
  • And Australia has, and will continue to forge, strong relationships with countries within and beyond our region.
• However, the dynamics of the current environment don't conform neatly to traditional geo-political frameworks.
• Some of these competing forces are likely to shape the identity and posture of states as we progress further into the 21st century, testing the resilience of the cosmopolitan culture with which the prospects of a healthy international system remain tied.
• Others are more subterranean, operating beneath state structures and across geographic borders.
  • Most of them may never have harmful consequences for security and stability, although some clearly will.
• The likelihood of instability in the global environment increases whenever political or ideological competition plays into regional or global imbalances; or manifests itself militantly in groups operating outside of state structures.
• Each of these volatilities is at work in the contemporary security environment.
• In fact, one of the most dangerous imbalances to emerge since the end of the Cold War is between:
  • the 'universe' of advanced political systems, where concentrated political and military power has been reshaped to meet the needs of advanced or post-industrial democracies; and
  • a 'pluriverse' of non-state groups and networks, whose ideological overreach propels them into bitter conflict with this world.

• This brings me to the problem of militant extremism.
• On current indications, terrorism around the globe is likely to be a destabilising force for the next generation.
• It is dynamic, difficult to predict and there is no guarantee we will be successful in preventing further mass casualty attacks or stopping its growth.
• Al-Qa'ida didn't arrive on the world scene with the attacks of 11 September 2001.
  • Its militant roots lie in the insurgency fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
  • Its doctrine has lineages in various strands of radical Islamic thought.
  • But its ideologically-driven goals are now global, and extend beyond the immediate horizon.
• With the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, the non-Afghan fighters might have decamped and returned home.
• Some did.
• Some looked for militant opportunities in other locations.
• But a core of like-minded extremists devoted themselves to reshaping militant jihad in global terms.
  • Firm in the belief that they had brought the Soviet Empire to its knees;
  • And zealously committed to reinventing the 'lost' Islamic caliphate;
  • Al-Qa'ida redefined itself in terms of a violent confrontation with the new 'universe' shaped by US political and military primacy.
• This act of ideological over-reach is defined most characteristically in the statement issued in 1998 by Usama bin Laden and others under the banner of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.
• This document specifically targets the United States and its allies - military and citizens - but broadly represents a renunciation of the international system, root and branch.
• The statement and the activity that followed departed from other types of militant Islamism, and from other brands of terrorism, because the theatre of operations extended across the geo-political space of any particular national setting.
  • As Bin Laden has said, al-Qa'ida pays no heed 'to borders and walls.'
• From its base in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida became a hub of extremist activity, forming trans-national networks, welcoming Islamic extremists from over the world (including Australia), training and indoctrinating them, and tasking them to carry out attacks against the USA and its allies 'wherever and whenever'.
• This extremist network culture developed, and still has, strategic and operational reach into our own region.
  • We've seen Jemaah Islamiyah - a terrorist group which had links to al-Qa'ida - carry out terrorist attacks against Western interests - including Australian interests - in Indonesia.
  • Successful counter-terrorism efforts by Indonesian authorities have eroded JI's capabilities, but Noordin Mohammad Top remains at large, and there is no room for complacency.
• What makes al-Qa'ida such a dangerous creature is its ability to marry ideological intensity with organisational resilience and adaptability.
  • Despite successful disruption activities, al-Qa'ida appears to be rebuilding both its organisational structures and operational capabilities from bases in the tribal regions bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, and networks in the Middle East, North Africa, and Western Europe.
• However ill-founded and over-wrought its world-view, it is a learning and a teaching organisation, pushing the horizon for violent extremism.
  • We've seen how extremists have grasped the significance of the internet for their media, recruitment and organisational strategies.
• But consider this.
  • Prior to August of last year some may have thought that 9/11 was so out of the ordinary as to be a one-off attack.
  • Yet the disrupted plot in August 2006 to use liquid explosives to destroy US-bound aircraft out of London's Heathrow airport indicates that 9/11 has extended rather than bounded the sphere of the possible for extremists.
• The implications for counter-terrorism include but go well beyond the design of preventative measures ensuring the safety of the travelling public.

• I will leave you with the following thoughts.
• In many ways, Napoleon's dictum has been turned on its head: policy no longer lies simply in geography.
• The complexities of the global security environment are compounding, and traditional strategic vocabularies have not always kept pace with the changes.
• Traditional geopolitical challenges relating to the balance of forces within and between states have been compounded by the rise of subterranean, trans-national groups and networks that, through their own ideological over-reach, have declared us their enemy.
• John Lewis Gaddis has said that, as intense as was the ideological and strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, their mutual possession of weapons of mass destruction created a "culture of caution that transcended ideology".
• The ideological vehemence and commitment of al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups defies all such cautionary logic, and promotes a militant attitude that disavows the value of human life.
• Nevertheless, some opinion downplays the significance of this threat, highlighting the gap between the extremists' ideology and intent and their capability and reach:
  • The argument being that, short of al-Qa'ida acquiring and using WMD, trans-national terrorism doesn't pose a threat to the existence of states.
• Such a statement obviously is incompatible with al-Qa'ida's self-declared ambition concerning the fate of states, and of the international system more broadly.
• As a consequence, al-Qa'ida and its adherents seek to enmesh multiple 'fronts' under the banner of a unified global mission.
• These 'fronts' include traditional theatres of war, but also major urban centres throughout the world.
  • As the list of terrorist attacks around the globe since 1990s demonstrate, no country can insulate itself from this strategy.
  • And, given that our way of life doesn't just take place within Australia's borders, but increasingly spans them, Australians have been killed and injured by terrorist attacks overseas.
• The argument that the threat from terrorism is exaggerated also ignores the dangers terrorist networks pose to vulnerable or failing states.
  • Trans-national Islamic terrorists don't require weapons of mass destruction to challenge the authority and legitimacy of such states, exploit their weak spots, or quietly rebuild capability under the radar, so to speak.
• This has significant consequences for the international system.
  • Which is why Australia's contribution to regional and wider international efforts to counter terrorism is a significant dimension of our strategy.
• Ignoring the national, regional and international dimensions, some commentators calculate the relative probability of harm across a broad range of activities and events, and say the risks posed by terrorism are no greater than other types of risk.
• We need to ask whether this approach stands up to scrutiny or common sense.
  • Unlike many other sources of harm or types of risk, terrorism directly challenges the principles of liberal democracy that underpin Australia's Constitution, and the type of society we have fostered and wish to protect.
• So, finally we come to the issue of the appropriate strategy in this environment.
• There are no easy solutions. Our strategy must be calibrated to deal with a complex security environment that demands short, medium and long term approaches.
• Our short term approach necessarily has focused on a raft of preventive measures, including a highly successful public awareness campaign about the dangers posed by terrorism, and the community's role in assisting in the prevention of possible attacks.
• In the medium term - and recognising that Australia's security goals interconnect with a broader set of regional and international challenges - our approach includes:
  • strengthening bilateral ties with key allies;
  • ongoing and greater engagement with regional and international multilateral fora; and
  • building better relations with moderate Muslim countries within and beyond the immediate region.
• The longer term solution involves contributing to global efforts to contest and marginalise the ideological space created by extremists to legitimate their activities and to reach out to potential recruits.
• Global terrorism is likely to remain a serious threat to the peace and security of Australia for some time. A successful counter-terrorism strategy therefore requires foresight, patience and resolve.
• The major asset for achieving these security goals now and into the future is less our geography than it is the strength and vitality of the values and the principles that underpin Australia's liberal democratic system of government.