Australian Institute of International Affairs
Director-General's Address
‘National Security: The Need for Global Collaboration'
31 May 2007
Good afternoon.
It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon and to have the opportunity to address the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
On 23 February 1998, Usama bin Laden and a number of associates issued a statement under the name of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.
It contained a passage that called for the killing of Americans and their allies as an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.
That includes Australia and Australians.
Subsequent statements by Bin Laden and other senior spokesmen for al-Qa'ida – the focus and mouthpiece for Islamic extremists around the world – may have included comment on localised or topical matters but all generally have echoed the same theme.
Such statements – and the grievances, the sense of ‘victimhood', the ideology and strategic vision that inspire them – transcend national and ethnic boundaries and resonate with extremists around the world, including in Australia.
The more sophisticated extremists have embraced an ideology that includes four main strands:
the ‘single narrative' that places the contemporary ‘anti-Muslim' nature of Western governments in a tradition stretching back to the Crusades;
an extreme interpretation of Islam that condemns as apostates those Muslims who do not subscribe to the same interpretation;
a political theory which holds that Western values – secularism, democracy and the separation of religion and state – are incompatible with Islam; and
the jihadist mission – where it is the duty of every individual Muslim to attack ‘Crusaders', the United States and its allies, and apostate Muslims.
There are others who are involved in extremist activity but who do not have so firm a grasp of the ideology or strategic vision but who are drawn to extremism by a variety of personal issues or grievances.
They may have a desire to be part of a group.
Affiliation may give them a clear identity in a society from which they feel alienated, resentful of what they may see as their social disadvantage and lack of any obvious life or career prospects.
They may feel anger over perceived Western attacks – literal or cultural – on Islam.
Regardless of their particular views or motivators, such people – including those in Australia – constitute a local dimension to a threat that has global implications.
Central to the global aims of al-Qa'ida is the elimination of Western influence from all ‘Muslim lands' and the establishment – or re-establishment – of a theocratic state or caliphate subject to Sharia Law.
The caliphate envisaged by the extremists ignores the 21st Century geo-political reality of nation states with defined borders.
For al-Qa'ida, the caliphate would include territory that spans parts of Europe; North Africa; the Middle East; and Central, South and South East Asia.
Whether the establishment of such a caliphate is a credible or realistic objective is irrelevant.
What is important to the extremists is to make progress towards the objective, one step at a time.
In our own region, we have seen Jemaah Islamiyah – a terrorist group with links to al-Qa'ida – carry out terrorist attacks against Western interests – including Australian interests – in Indonesia.
Apart from involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings, the terrorist cell within Jemaah Islamiyah led by Noordin Mohammad Top has been directly responsible for all the anti-Western attacks in Indonesia, including the 9 September 2004 Australian Embassy and 1 October 2005 Bali bombings, both of which specifically targeted Australians.
There are other radical groups in Indonesia who express extremist rhetoric threatening anti-Western attacks but so far none has demonstrated that they have the intent or the capability to do so.
The persistent and wide-ranging actions taken by Indonesian security and police authorities have had a substantial impact on Jemaah Islamiyah and continue to erode its capability.
But while Noordin remains at large, further terrorist attacks against Australian and other Western interests are likely.
Calls to action by Bin Laden and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, have urged extremists not to make any distinction between military and civilian targets – thus making all targets legitimate if they might contribute to advancing the greater cause.
They also have instructed would-be terrorists that attacks should not be limited to places where Islam currently is considered to be under attack.
In many cases the victims of terrorist attacks have been Muslims and other non-Westerners.
However, the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians – as powerful an impact as that may have on the Western psyche – is not the most important objective for the extremists.
It is a means to an end.
Importantly, part of the extremists' strategy involves a process of attrition that is directed at wearing down and eliminating their enemies – whether they be secular governments in Muslim countries, the United States, or other Western countries – by chipping away at them economically and politically.
It is the lasting economic, political and social impact that attacks can cause that is significant, including through the multiplier and flow-on effect that attacks can have well beyond the initial incident.
There are numerous examples of this multiplier effect:
The attacks in the United States in 2001 struck at that country's economic core with a range of effects continuing to reverberate around the world.
The attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005 had a significant impact on the local economy, mainly through their effects on tourism.
Attacks on embassies, including the attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, were intended to act as a disincentive for foreign interests to operate in a host country by introducing a higher level of physical risk.
Attacks on major Western hotels can have a negative effect on the willingness of business and other interests to engage in a host country.
Attacks on the French oil tanker, the MV Limburg, in 2002 struck at foreign economic interests in the Middle East.
Similarly, on the Arabian Peninsula al-Qa'ida has attacked oil installations, killing and injuring Westerners and influencing oil prices.
Attacks on aircraft, airports or other modes of mass transit – as occurred on a large scale in the United States in September 2001, Spain in March 2004, the United Kingdom in July 2005 and other attacks that were planned but unsuccessful – have the effect of making ordinary commercial life in Western countries and between Western nations and in the international community generally, more difficult to conduct.
Fortunately, even with the number and frequency of attacks stretching back more than a decade to the early 1990s, the extremists have not been successful in undermining the parliamentary, commercial or social systems of their perceived enemies.
But there is no basis to suspect that they have given up on this objective.
And we continue to see new extremists emerge who share this intent.
In Australia, we are exposed regularly to media images of tragedy and destruction in the Middle East, a resurgent conflict in Afghanistan and numerous other localised confrontations involving Muslims and non-Muslims in places as diverse as parts of Africa, South and South East Asia.
The distressing nature of the events portrayed in much of this reporting both informs and shapes the public perception of the threat in these troubled parts of the world.
Extremist spokesmen such as Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Abu Bakr Bashir and others are aware of the powerful impact of such images and seek to shape their rhetoric in ways that undermine public support in the West for engagement in these regions.
One of the aspects that makes overcoming this threat so challenging is that extremists do not always organise themselves in ways that are familiar to us or that conform to Western ideas about organisational structure.
There may not be clearly defined lines of authority or centralised control.
They may seek to conceal their activities and linkages to others from other members of the community and the authorities.
They do not generally operate according to any model that might lend itself to a direct confrontation – or to direct negotiation.
Nor do they operate within a temporal frame of reference that sits comfortably with the political and social cycle of Western societies.
What we see is a loose network of networks that stubbornly refuses to be categorised according to neat Western constructs.
So what does that mean for ASIO and Australia's national security?
Countering a threat that is so pervasive, adaptable and enduring is beyond the scope of any one country acting unilaterally or in isolation.
Further, it demands a strategy that extends well beyond the work of national intelligence and law enforcement agencies operating within a domestic context.
That is why agencies such as ASIO cannot afford to be focussed only on what is happening on our own shores.
And why it is so important that there be widespread understanding about what is driving the terrorist threat that we are facing as a nation.
Conceiving the threat only in terms of the graphic media images or as largely discrete events or incidents runs the risk of perpetuating a view that the issue is a short term phenomenon and that it can be solved with some quick fixes.
The unfortunate reality is that this will be a long struggle.
As Australia's national security intelligence service, ASIO's role is first and foremost the prevention of harm to Australia, Australians and Australian interests from the threats to security that are specified in the ASIO Act.
Achieving that objective, involves much more than defeating or diffusing and neutralising an amorphous threat.
So ASIO's investigations are directed at ensuring, as far as is possible, that we are able to detect at an early stage any indication of people planning to do harm to others and to prevent them from achieving their objective by using all lawful means available to us.
Importantly, the ASIO Act also specifies that the Organisation's responsibility for countering threats to security extends to whether these threats are ‘directed from, or committed within, Australia or not'.
This is a significant point – particularly against the background of the terrorist threat that I have outlined – because it means that ASIO's reach and focus cannot be confined just to activity inside Australia.
Indeed, to do so against the transnational Islamic terrorist threat that permeates so much of the world today would be both short-sighted and dangerous.
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan says that Australia relies on an intelligence-led strategy for countering the terrorist threat with a particular focus on prevention.
That means that we need access to intelligence that allows us to produce accurate, timely assessments of threats.
Those assessments underpin ASIO's advice to other agencies with responsibility for implementing appropriate protective measures.
Maintaining an intelligence edge in an evolving security environment also means that we need to be innovative and agile in our response to developments in the security environment in Australia and around the world.
The continuing growth of ASIO means that we have more resources to devote to this important work.
It also means that we have been able to extend and strengthen our international liaison network – a key plank in our overall strategy and capability.
At 30 June 2006, ASIO had 268 approved liaison relationships in 113 countries – that number continues to grow as our work takes us to places where we have not previously needed to be engaged.
This international network provides us with access to intelligence and capabilities which are vital in progressing security intelligence investigations.
It also provides us with an opportunity to work with friends and allies to build our respective capabilities as part of a broader shared purpose.
ASIO's international engagement with its counterparts around the world also makes an important contribution to wider government efforts directed at countering the threat of terrorism.
As you can see, the ASIO of today is an organisation that is in the midst of a fundamental transformation and one that will continue to provide interesting work and career opportunities for its current and future staff.
In a tight and competitive employment market, ASIO's recruitment advertising campaigns continue to attract high calibre applicants who bring a diversity of skills and attributes to bear on the important work that we do.
ASIO will continue to seek out and recruit a range of people to perform a variety of functions, including intelligence officers and analysts, surveillance officers, human resource specialists, technical and IT professionals, project managers, finance staff and more.
Let me leave you with the following thoughts.
Australia and Australians are seen as a ‘crusader nation' by extremists so we will continue to face threats for some time simply because of who we are.
So we need to have a clear understanding of the global and historic aspects that provide the frame of reference for extremists, to inform the choices we make as a nation about how we respond to the threat.
The diffuse nature of the threat and its evolution into new and challenging manifestations demand cooperation and collaboration on a global scale if we are to be effective in countering it.
There can be no guarantees that we always will be successful in preventing attacks but we need to maintain and build our capabilities, including our relationships with our friends and allies around the world, with a view to the longer term.
Thank you.