Australian Strategic Policy Institute Address
Australia's Security Environment
2 November 2005
This evening I'd like to share a few thoughts with you about the security environment confronting Australia and the challenges it presents to intelligence and law enforcement agencies and to the wider Australian community.
For ASIO, security is defined in relatively precise terms in the ASIO Act. It means the protection of the people of Australia from espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence - that is, terrorism , the promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system or acts of foreign interference; whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not.
Of course, since 2001 ASIO's major focus has been counter - terrorism and increasingly the threat of terrorist attacks directed at Australians here or abroad.
It is a matter of public record that Australians have been specifically targeted and killed or injured by terrorists in Bali, Jakarta and Baghdad.
Australians have also been caught up in terrorist attacks directed at others, including the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the July 2005 attacks in London and other attacks including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
While we have not had a terrorist attack in Australia since the 1986 bombing of the Turkish Consulate-General in Melbourne, we know of individuals in Australia and elsewhere intent on conducting an attack here and/or supporting others to achieve this goal:
Australian Muslim convert Jack Roche is currently serving a prison term after he was convicted on charges related to planning a terrorist attack against Israeli diplomatic premises in Sydney and Canberra.
Willy Brigitte remains in French custody and a number of his Australian associates are subject to legal proceedings on terrorism-related charges.
Sydney-based Belal Khazaal has been twice convicted on terrorism- related charges in Lebanon, and is facing terrorism-related charges in Australia.
In our 2004-05 Report to Parliament tabled yesterday (1 November) we said that we continued to identify Australians who have undertaken terrorist training or engaged in militant jihad. In 2004-05 we questioned ten people on terrorism-related matters under the authority of questioning warrants.
However, we need to remain realistic, and acknowledge that intelligence and law enforcement agencies will not be omnipotent and all-knowing:
as the incidents in London in July showed all too clearly when they occurred without warning and without the perpetrators previously coming to the notice of the British authorities in a significant terrorism-related context; and
also illustrated recently in the Netherlands where a routine police traffic stop resulted in an investigation which identified a Belgian-born individual with Moroccan heritage, linked to a terrorist organisation based in Morocco involved in suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003, as well as suspected links to the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the Iraqi insurgency.
Public discussion continues about the causes and drivers of the militant interpretation of Islam that motivates transnational terrorists to undertake indiscriminate suicide attacks against innocent civilians - resulting in death or injury to Westerners and non-Westerners alike. I do not propose to add to this debate but would note that:
the challenge for intelligence and law enforcement agencies is to identify, investigate and lawfully disrupt such people;
a task made increasingly difficult as there is no set "Terrorist Profile". They may come from a range of socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds, from illiterate peasants to educated middle class professionals, converts or long-term residents in Western countries, or any number of other variables.
Irrespective of the causes, it is an unfortunate truism that terrorism will continue to be the defining element in Australia's security environment for quite some time.
Notwithstanding our successes over recent years in detecting and disrupting planning for attacks in Australia, ASIO continues to assess that a terrorist attack in Australia is feasible and could well occur.
Detecting such planning is difficult and we cannot be certain that we will always have prior intelligence that can enable prevention.
However, the significantly increased funding the Government has committed to ASIO that will see the number of ASIO staff grow to 1860 by 2010-11 will ensure ASIO is better able to meet its responsibilities.
Against this background I put it to you that we continue to face three broad scenarios:
A terrorist team could enter Australia undetected and might or might not seek local support to carry out an attack.
essentially the 9/11 scenario;
Home grown Islamic extremists could bring in specific expertise.
as apparently happened with Willy Brigitte;
Home grown extremists could mount an attack on their own.
There are people in Australia who have trained with al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups, some of whom are known to us; others we identify as our investigations proceed; but there are likely to be some others who do not come to our notice.
Precisely the same situation as that confronting our British colleagues.
Not that overseas training is necessary to acquire skills - some forms of attack require minimal skills, and information on terrorist techniques is readily available through sources such as the internet.
As we saw in Bali on 1 October.
Within the context of these three broad scenarios periodic media speculation about the number of 'terrorists' in Australia is neither helpful nor meaningful.
It can be misleading in terms of the dimension of the challenge we face and the evolving/dynamic nature of the situation at a particular point in time.
For example, we know from experience here with the Brigitte case and elsewhere that individuals can rapidly evolve from the apparent periphery to being of great security concern.
It is important to note that such numbers can only be speculative, in part because the radicalisation process amongst local extremists is ongoing.
Which is why we need the capabilities and laws that give us a chance to uncover the unknown individuals and groups, not just investigate the known extremists in our community.
There continue to be people in our community who inspire others and attract new recruits by advocating extremist views and support for terrorism. Others are prepared to facilitate terrorist training or links to like-minded extremists abroad.
These aspects are not adequately covered in our current laws.
Extremists' security tradecraft continues to improve. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies need the powers and capabilities to develop and maintain their effectiveness against these improving modus operandi and techniques.
Particularly as the timeframe between planning, preparation, surveillance and attack can be unnervingly short.
So powers are needed to intervene in some way very swiftly, even on imperfect knowledge, if an attack is to be prevented.
Equally, if perpetrators are to be caught and prosecuted, information to assist investigations needs to be quickly accessible and evidence must be able to be obtained and preserved in a timely fashion.
Let me conclude by saying that we do not see the problem of terrorism going away in the near or even medium term future.
It has emerged as a self sustaining and self-renewing movement and is likely to be a generational issue.
We should not be intimidated by the challenge but continue to meet it with the right mix of resolve, resources, perseverance and perspective.