AFP Executive Retreat
25 October 2005
This evening I'd like to share a few thoughts with you from the perspective of someone who has spent a little over three months as the head of ASIO and Director-General of Security. You will be aware of the review into ASIO resourcing undertaken by Allan Taylor over the last few months. That review was well underway before I was appointed as Director-General and flowed in part from a perception that there was scope to identify efficiencies in ASIO.
In fact Allan Taylor's review found that ASIO was significantly under resourced to meet the current and expected demands on it.
As a result, two weeks ago the Prime Minister announced additional resources that will see ASIO double in size to around 1860 staff over the next 5 years.
The challenge for me as Director-General over that period will be to lead ASIO through a period of unprecedented growth:
in a rapidly evolving security environment which is challenging for people working in intelligence and law enforcement - to comprehend fully;
and in a legislative framework that has already provided new powers to intelligence and law enforcement agencies with more to come:
some of which do not sit comfortably with civil libertarians, some senior legal commentators, or elements within the communities in which we operate; and
some of which have yet to be tested in practice in the field or in the courts.
To illustrate how far we have already come, let me briefly take you back to late October 2000 - a time before the watershed attacks in New York in 2001. In late October 2000:
the Sydney Olympics and Paralympics had not long finished and everyone was basking in the after-glow of a job well done. Games security had been thorough but largely unobtrusive and there were no incidents of any consequence.
ASIO's investigative focus around that time was largely on what could loosely be termed 'traditional targets' or at least targets that operated - to varying degrees - within structured organisational frameworks that could be identified and investigated using tried and proven methods.
Even al-Qa'ida was still seen at that time by many as an 'organisation' to be targeted and disrupted with its 'leader', Usama bin Laden, as a major focus for investigations.
ASIO investigations into the Australian links to emerging terrorist networks were well advanced although, as recent experience has shown, the problem confronting us continues to grow and manifest itself in new ways.
The threat of terrorism - while real - was seen largely as remote and directed at others:
Australians primarily were at risk overseas, particularly if they were unfortunate enough to be caught up in attacks directed at others.
We certainly had identified people and groups in Australia who were supporters of the likes of bin Laden and who had travelled overseas to train and fight, but the focus of their interest and activities was mainly jihad theatres overseas.
We were not aware of:
Jack Roche planning attacks against Israeli interests in Sydney and Canberra;
al-Qa'ida specifically seeing Australia as a legitimate target as a result of our role in East Timor;
the planning in Singapore by Jemaah Islamiyah against the Australian High Commission and other targets; and
reconnaissance of an Australian airport by al-Qa'ida before 9/11.
Of course, since that fateful Tuesday in September 2001 things have changed fundamentally. Now, in October 2005, we have been shown that Australia and Australians are terrorist targets. Usama bin Laden and others have said as much and some have translated their words into deeds:
through attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005, Jakarta in 2004 and Baghdad in 2005;
and, if not for cooperative intelligence and police work on counter-terrorism over the last several years we may have seen attacks here as a result of the activities of Willy Brigitte and his associates in 2003, or others that have been the subject of more recent attention or perhaps if Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had visited Australia in 2001 as he apparently planned.
We should be grateful for our successes in preventing an attack in Australia, but I suspect this situation may be transitory. If we were to meet back here in 2010, I wonder if we would still be in this position.
Our British colleagues had enjoyed similar successes over the last few years with their disruption of planned attacks including spreading ricin on handrails in the London Underground and using ammonium nitrate, possibly to blow up hotels, restaurants and railway stations.
But the London attacks on 7 July by mainly British-born and raised, home-grown terrorists showed it is possible for unknown elements to plan and conduct such attacks without any forewarning.
And this, despite the professionalism and competence of British security and police agencies whose skills and experience has been honed over many years dealing with Irish terrorism.
Which brings me back to the Prime Minister's announcement a little over a week ago that will see ASIO double in size to meet the current and future challenges facing us. Such growth will also result in a vastly different organisation to the ASIO of 2005. Some of the things that will become apparent to AFP officers engaged with ASIO at all levels will include:
A modest growth in overseas representation through additional liaison offices and our growing engagement with traditional and new intelligence partners wherever our work takes us.
The growth in our 24/7 operations.
The expansion of our cooperative partnerships with Australian intelligence and law enforcement partners. On that note, let me make three points:
I am grateful for the willing assistance and acceptance I have received from Commissioner Keelty and Deputy Commissioner Lawler since I took on this role and I look forward to developing a close and productive relationship.
The regular meetings of the senior management groups of both agencies will continue to be an important element in the way we manage the relationship between our two agencies.
So too will be the requirement to encourage and reinforce cooperation and regular engagement at the working level.
But perhaps the biggest change will come about as a result of us bringing on board about 900 new people at the rate of around 170 people a year.
Some commentators have questioned our ability to grow at this rate. Certainly it will be a challenge to attract, recruit and retain high calibre people with the right mix of skills and personal attributes. But it is pertinent to note that we have in fact recruited over 700 staff since June 2000, of which around 420 staff have joined us since June 2003.
While this creates an experience gap in the short term and imposes other strains on the Organisation, new staff bring with them energy, enthusiasm, creativity and fresh perspectives to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
As we undergo this exciting transformation the need for ASIO and AFP to continue to work closely and cooperatively will only increase:
The likely introduction of a control order/preventative detention regime will require close cooperation given that such arrangements will likely draw heavily on ASIO intelligence; and
will continue to support the AFP prosecutions of people charged with terrorism offences.
Against the counter-terrorism environment and organisational backgrounds I have just outlined, I see a number of challenges and opportunities for senior leaders in intelligence and law enforcement agencies:
Firstly, we need to recognise what we don't know and how those gaps make us vulnerable. Our known unknowns, if you will. It is these gaps which we need to work away at while we are also diligently working to investigate and/or prosecute identified threats.
Secondly, as senior leaders and managers, we need to ensure that the intellectual and operational capabilities of our people and organisations are developed and applied creatively and in new ways to deal with the problems we are facing now and into the future, not the problems of the past.
Thirdly, as we grow our organisations and seek to fill the experience gap with skills and knowledge, we can't lose sight of the need to nurture an organisational culture, and indeed a law enforcement/intelligence community culture that:
is based on mutual respect and professionalism;
promotes understanding of each others different roles and responsibilities;
encourages initiative and values cooperation;
recognises individual achievement but applauds teamwork; and
engenders pride in serving the community by fulfilling our role of assuring them, as far as we are able, that we are protecting them from those who would do us harm.
And our final challenge: to use the new powers granted to us under legislation appropriately, in strict conformance with the law that balances a long-term perspective against short-term demands.
Because ultimately as intelligence and law enforcement agencies we can only be effective so long as we enjoy the trust of the community we serve and in which we operate.