Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration
‘Access Card'
Director-General's Opening Statement
6 March 2007
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee in connection with the access card issue.
I think it would be useful if I provided some context which should assist the Committee to understand ASIO's role in connection with the access card.
I note from the record that some of the questions already raised by members of the Committee relate to operational capabilities or methods.
However, consistent with long standing practice, I will not be able to provide specific responses on those operational matters in this forum.
Since 2002 the Parliament has enacted specific legislation that is directed at ensuring that intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies have the powers to enable them to be effective in countering the security threats that we face, particularly in connection with terrorism.
That has happened against the background of successful attacks against Australians overseas and others in Australia that were planned, aborted or disrupted.
The ultimate goal of security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies is the protection of Australia, Australians and Australian interests from harm.
In the case of ASIO, the threats to security are defined in the ASIO Act.
That means preventing those who would seek to maim, kill or destroy the people, the values, and the things we cherish.
Operating within this environment means that ASIO's security intelligence investigations must remain focussed on individuals and groups or organisations whose activities, background and associations are assessed to be relevant to security and to present a sufficient threat to warrant investigation by ASIO.
ASIO operates strictly within the legislative framework put in place by the Parliament.
ASIO also is subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney-General which require that any ASIO requests for access to personal information held by Commonwealth agencies must be limited to what is reasonably necessary for the purposes of approved investigations.
These guidelines are available publicly, including on ASIO's website.
ASIO has a system of internal procedures and protocols which require investigations to be authorised by senior or SES officers.
I would note that ASIO does not require a warrant from the Attorney-General in order to seek information from other Commonwealth agencies.
But all investigations are subject to oversight by the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.
And any intrusion into the privacy of individuals must be commensurate with the assessed level of threat.
ASIO draws on a range of information in conducting its investigations, including information available publicly, information provided by other Australian agencies or international liaison partners, as well as information obtained covertly through a range of means, including under warrants issued by the Attorney-General.
Increasingly, people who are of security interest are becoming more adept at concealing their activities and true intentions in order to avoid detection by the authorities.
So, investigations into their activities which are relevant to security need to be done discreetly if they are to be effective.
Any requirement which demanded the consent of individuals before the collection of their personal information, or required them to be advised of the purpose of the collection, or provided for access to ASIO's records would necessarily be completely incompatible with the discreet investigations to which I have just referred.
Such requirements would alert people of security interest to the existence of covert investigations and would risk inappropriate disclosure of ASIO's methods, capabilities and sources.
It also would undermine ASIO's domestic and international liaison relationships, since partner agencies would be likely to withhold intelligence if there were a requirement for ASIO to disclose this information to persons of security interest.
ASIO's requirement to obtain a range of information about people of security interest is not new.
It has been central to ASIO's work since the establishment of the Organisation in 1949.
I note and agree with comments by Senator Campbell on 16 February 2007 to this committee when he said that ‘access by ASIO or any of the other agencies, such as the Federal Police, to information is not changed by the access card.' He went on to say that ‘we are not going to give them any more powers'.
The use of intrusive methods of investigation inevitably raises questions about the balance between meeting national security imperatives and civil liberties.
How the balance is defined at any particular moment is an issue for interpretation and debate, in the first place and most importantly, in this Parliament.
From ASIO's perspective, the current balance and the framework that is in place are appropriate to the tasks we have been assigned under our Act.
While I cannot go into details about methodology or capability, I can advise the Committee that:
ASIO will not have on-line access to the access card register or database – requests for information would be made to the Department of Human Services.
Neither will ASIO officers be permitted to ask to see the access card of a person who is to be interviewed, consistent with Clause 6(2) of the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007.
Finally, Section 20 of the ASIO Act places a special responsibility on me as the Director-General of Security to ‘take all reasonable steps to ensure that the work of the Organisation is limited to what is necessary for the purposes of the discharge of the Organisation's functions'.
ASIO has systems and procedures in place to achieve that requirement and actively nurtures an organisational culture directed at ensuring that it occurs.
That is why ASIO's investigations will remain tightly focussed, strictly controlled and fully accountable.
I will be pleased to respond to your questions to the extent that I am able in this public forum.