National Food Chain Safety and Security Strategy Conference
Director-General's Address
'Counter Terrorism and Business'
2 May 2006

• Thank you also for the opportunity to share some of my perspectives on Australia's security environment and to talk about ASIO's business outreach strategy.
• I'd like to say up-front that it is a strategy designed to extend and consolidate ASIO's partnership with the business community.
• It is well known that Australians and Australian interests here and abroad continue to be seen by terrorists as legitimate targets.
  • Australia has been named publicly by al-Qa'ida leaders Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus'abal-Zarqawi and by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as a target.
  • And there has been at least one aborted, disrupted or actual terrorist attack against Australian interests each year in the period from 2000 to 2005.
• ASIO's National Threat Assessment Centre assesses that for the foreseeable future Australia will face an enduring threat from al-Qa'ida, associated groups, and individuals committed to violent jihad.
  • Australian interests remain potential primary targets for attack in Australia and in a number of countries around the world.
• As I previously have said publicly, the challenge for all of us - governments, agencies, businesses and communities - is to ensure our perception and characterisation of the threat remains realistic and appropriate and that we shape our response to the threat in ways that are determined, measured and appropriate.
• Clearly, the business of counter-terrorism is not the exclusive domain of ASIO, nor of the government alone. Responsibility for responding to the threat and taking sensible precautions is spread across a range of areas.
• Shaping that response is not something that can or should be done in isolation. That is why ASIO is enhancing its engagement with relevant parts of the business sector.
• At this point, I would like to offer my observations - from a security perspective - regarding the food sector:
  • The most characteristic aspect of this sector, to my mind, is the extent of the interdependencies and the diversity of processes that are required to deliver food to the final consumer.
  • It is perhaps also important to note that, in contrast to other critical infrastructure sectors such as electricity or communications, it is not the physical infrastructure of the food sector that is important. The food itself must be safe.
  • Even when the core business processes operate 'to spec', they remain subject to the influence and, at times, devastating impact of natural disasters, pests and disease, or malicious acts.
  • Malicious acts, whether they involve real acts of harm or hoaxes, can cause significant disruption to businesses and consumers alike.
  • Previous experience has been that such malicious acts have been criminal in nature, driven by perpetrators either seeking to extort money or enact a form of revenge.
    • In the case of Masterfoods, withdrawal of Mars and Snickers bars was estimated to have cost the company around $10m following an extortion attempt that received significant publicity last year.
    • Similarly, the recall of Arnott's biscuits, triggered by another extortion attempt, had an even larger estimated cost impact of around $22m. Difficulty in identifying the extortionist led to prolonged damage to consumer confidence, no doubt exacerbating the financial impact.
• These events can have a wider impact on the community and, in extreme cases, have the potential to undermine the community's confidence in the safety and integrity of the food supply. It would not be surprising, therefore, if such an impact might hold appeal for a potential terrorist.
• In reference to my earlier comments about the intent and capability of terrorists to conduct attacks against Australia - quite obviously, a number of these factors have direct or indirect relevance to the food sector.
  • For example, explosives-based attacks against crowded venues have been conducted overseas, including against food service venues such as restaurants and hotels.
    • The second Bali bombing is a recent example of such targeting.
    • Such tactics could be applied to food service venues in Australia to significant effect.
• Or, one might hypothesise that crude contamination of foods might represent one of the simplest means to conduct an attack - and even a limited attack would likely cause considerable community anxiety.
• I make these points to illustrate the diversity of potential challenges posed to the food sector by the current security environment and to stress the need to give these issues due consideration.
• Taking sensible precautions against such possibilities involves government and business working together to factor 'all hazards' into the development of policy and risk management plans, particularly in connection with protecting Australia's critical infrastructure.
  • It is through this partnership that policy and practice remain properly aligned, relevant and effective.
• Later this morning you will hear from ASIO's Director of Critical Infrastructure Protection who will provide a specific briefing describing ASIO's threat assessment process.
• The Critical Infrastructure Protection team at ASIO works with relevant federal government departments, such as the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry and the Department of Health, to assess the threat from terrorism to specific sectors. Based on ASIO's advice, the relevant department prepares risk context statements for the sector, which contain advice and information to assist the sector to undertake relevant risk mitigation activity.
• In formulating sector-specific threat advice ASIO has worked closely with relevant players to gain a detailed understanding of the inherent vulnerabilities of specific business processes.
  • This engagement continues to be an indispensable part of accurate threat analysis.
  • Collaboration and the valuable cooperation of business means ASIO can prepare tailored advice to meet the specific needs of each sector.
• Producing these sectoral assessments involves a considerable investment of time and effort - generally around 12 months from the commissioning to the release of a sector-specific threat assessment.
• I mention this timeframe because it has direct relevance to my next comments regarding ASIO's new Business Liaison Unit which represents the next phase in ASIO's business outreach strategy.
• Feedback from the business community highlighted what businesses saw as gaps in their relationship with the Australian Intelligence Community.
  • In the case of ASIO, businesses wanted a relationship that would see information and advice more directly disseminated to the business sector.
  • Businesses also expressed concern that the release of threat-related information was not always timely enough to be of value in their risk planning processes.
• ASIO's role under legislation is to provide threat advice to government and law enforcement agencies.
• However, while it may have been necessary for ASIO to gather information directly from business as part of the threat assessment process, businesses generally would not receive direct threat assessment advice back from ASIO.
  • As part of our broader role in protecting Australians and Australian interests from the threat of terrorism, ASIO is seeking to enhance its relationship with business by providing appropriate advice directly to business, advice that can assist security managers to plan their response to a terrorist threat.
  • Such advice, based on an informed assessment of the threat and provided in a timely manner, should assist businesses to put in place measures that are realistic and appropriate.
• Against this background, ASIO's Business Liaison Unit was established in late 2005 to provide a direct interface between business and the Australian Intelligence Community.
• The principal outputs of the Business Liaison Unit will be:
  • to develop sector-specific Business Security Reports and to update these regularly;
  • to launch a secure website for business containing these reports and a range of other security and event-specific information; and
  • to provide a point-of-contact for business to access the services of the Australian Intelligence Community.
• Such services might include advice on protective security, information security and briefings and presentations to help build awareness throughout the business community on national security matters.
• In concluding this address I would like to emphasise the following:
  • Although current activity by intelligence, law enforcement and other agencies may have disrupted some terrorist planning, there is no indication that the threat is abating.
  • The challenge for governments, agencies, businesses and communities is to ensure our understanding of the threat remains realistic and appropriate and that we shape our response to the threat in ways that are in proportion to the actual risks.
  • ASIO will continue to adapt and develop new and innovative ways of working with the community.
  • For business this means a more service-oriented approach highlighted by the Business Liaison Unit but underpinned by the continued efforts of the intelligence community as a whole.
• Thank you and I hope the remainder of the conference provides you with practical and valuable information that will allow you to protect your assets, your people and your business.