European Australian Business Council
Director-General's Speech
28 February 2008
Introduction
I would like to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to address the European Australian Business Council.
Your commitment to promoting business interests between Australia and the member states of the EU is valuable and important.
Australia of course has longstanding and well developed ties with many of the countries that make up the European Union.
Many Australians fought and gave their lives during the major wars of the 20th century in European theatres.
And somewhat in excess of 90 per cent of Australians have European ancestry.
Australia also has a strong and active bilateral relationship with the EU, built on a common commitment to liberal democratic values, and encompassing shared goals on various significant international issues, like counter-terrorism.
Australia has significant trade links with the EU. And we shouldn't forget, in the current climate of the resources boom, and the rapidly growing economies of China and India, that the EU is in fact our largest trading partner.
The EU is the world's biggest single internal market; and the largest market for services.
In 2006:
total trade between Australia and the EU equalled $75 billion;
around 1.3 million Europeans visited Australia; and
more than 25,000 students from the EU were enrolled in Australian institutions.
And each year, many Australians - around 700,000 in fact - visit EU countries to work, to visit relatives, or as tourists.
So what happens within the EU, and what the EU does, matters both to the international community and to Australia.
The European Union - some context
I want to talk to you today about some of the security challenges confronting Australia and EU countries in the post 9/11 environment, and why our engagement and cooperation is important.
I think it is first worth pausing, though, to reflect on what a remarkable achievement the EU really is.
I don't think we can really understand Europe's approach to security, and the work EU countries are doing to protect their citizens from terrorism, without appreciating how and why the EU developed.
Since its formal creation with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has been the source of theoretical discomfort to some observers because of its unique characteristics as a political entity.
For what do you call something that has:
a parliament, but is not a state;
a foreign policy of sorts, but no army; and
a quasi form of citizenship, based on common laws and freedoms, but lacking strong common civic or national traditions?
The difficulty of classification, though, shouldn't overshadow strong areas of practical accomplishment.
Despite significant national differences between its now 27 member states, the EU has managed to achieve a considerable degree of internal uniformity and harmonisation, particularly in the spheres of law and commerce, much to the envy of those nation states who struggle to achieve anything comparable within their own borders.
Another, perhaps more fundamental, observation I would like to make is that the EU is remarkable not only for
what
it is; but simply
that
it is.
Throughout the twentieth century, Europe experienced extraordinary twists of fate and wide-ranging geopolitical transformations - perhaps none more unexpected than the evolution of the EU on a continent that twice sacrificed blood and treasure on an unprecedented scale.
The First World War was fully European in origin and character, and was fought principally in European theatres. Its geopolitical repercussions were far reaching, however, and extended far beyond the European continent.
Some of the key geopolitical frictions of our day were set in play by decisions made, or not made, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
The Second World War, again, was European in origin, although it was played out on a much larger, basically global, stage, with the Pacific theatre becoming of vital strategic import.
The Cold War changed the script somewhat by effectively transforming the strategic contest between the US and the USSR into one that was fully global in character; and, with the arrival of nuclear weapons, potentially catastrophic in consequence.
Still, it is hard to think of anywhere where the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War were as acutely or concretely defined - no pun intended -as continental Europe.
I've spent a sizeable portion of my career in Europe: three years in Rome; three in Geneva; and four in Berlin. And something that we should neither forget nor underestimate in dealing with Europe is how much 'history' with a capital 'H' forms part of the political landscape.
This is certainly evident in the EU's approach to security.
The weight of history is palpable, for instance, in the
European Security Strategy
, promulgated in 2003, which begins, and I quote:
The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens.
And it is implicit, more broadly, in the very idea of 'collective security' that developed in Western Europe -
taking shape not only in light of the historical experience of two devastating wars; but
also in response to the possibility of a catastrophic confrontation between a post-war Europe divided into a liberal democratic 'West' and a communist 'East'.
Europe was exhausted, in the aftermath of WWII, by large-scale military conflict, and determined to limit, if not remove entirely, the conditions that had given rise to belligerent interstate rivalry during the first half of the twentieth century.
While the unfolding Cold War prevented this wish from becoming a pan-European reality, the necessity of achieving a strategically unified Western Europe became all the more pressing as the Soviets transformed Eastern Europe into a communist bloc with loyalties and dependencies owing to Moscow.
US military power undoubtedly made collective security possible in Western Europe, principally through NATO. But the prospect of this new approach gaining ground was also greatly assisted by the range of confidence building measures undertaken between formerly bitter enemies; and
the panoply of trans-national economic and legal norms that framed the common market -
the cumulative effect of which was to build considerable interdependencies between the key major Western European powers.
The key point to take forward from these remarks is the very strong link forged within the European Union between 'security' and 'openness'.
As Robert Cooper, the former special adviser on foreign affairs to Tony Blair, has suggested, the EU has evolved a trans-national approach that pursues
'security through transparency and transparency through interdependence'
.
An approach, needless to say, that represents a profound break with Europe's own past, and with some of the key tenets informing the practice of statecraft outside of the EU.
The preferred European approach to security strongly emphasises consensus, cooperation, and coordination, the underlying idea being
'we are stronger when we act together'
.
The EU approach to the new security environment
There has been significant debate both within and outside of the EU about the strategic efficacy of its political framework in the new global security environment.
Some see the EU as a labyrinthine bureaucracy drawing heavily on the reserves of political and intellectual capital of Europeans, and encouraging an insular and inward focus in a world that demands precisely the opposite.
There is also the view, articulated by Robert Kagan, that the European formula for security is ill-suited to the tasks of international stability and security.
On this view, the de-militarisation of foreign policy within the EU - the very basis of the European security community - leads Europeans mistakenly to view all international problems through the same lens; or, where they do accept the use of force as necessary, to see it as a job for others.
The question is whether, in Tony Judt's phrase, the EU is able to
'escape the defects of its virtues'.
There is no doubt that the work of European integration, particularly the transition to a common currency in the late 1990s; and the work of enlargement from 15 to 25 countries in 2004; and to 27 countries last year; were major and absorbing issues for the EU.
However, it would be mistaken, in my view, to believe that the EU is incapable of responding to new challenges; or that,
with globalisation, and the range of pressures acting on the security and stability of the international environment, it can't continue to evolve its capacity for international engagement.
No architecture is perfect, and I don't think anyone would deny the complexity of some of the issues involved in making the EU work.
Recent initiatives in the EU's evolving security framework indicate that significant effort is being made to respond to the rise of trans-national terrorism, and the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The aforementioned
European Security Strategy
acknowledged that
'Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism'
.
Although, at the time, it may not have been appreciated fully to what extent, given that the strategy was issued:
before the March 2004 attacks on four commuter trains in Madrid, that killed 191 people, and injured more than 2,000; and
before the coordinated suicide attacks against London's public transport system in July 2005, that killed 52 people, and injured a further 700.
This direct and tragic experience of terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists inside the EU, together with a growing appreciation of the radicalisation of some sections of European Muslim communities, prompted the development of a common counter-terrorism policy framework.
The
European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy
, released in late 2005, is built around the four pillars of 'prevent', 'protect', 'pursue' and 'respond'.
Unlike other areas of European policy, counter-terrorism strategy is predicated more on cooperation, than integration, and the primary responsibility for counter-terrorism continues to lie with individual member states.
The EU sees its role as promoting stronger cooperation between member states; fostering their joint capabilities, particularly through information sharing; and developing key international partnerships.
A truism guiding counter-terrorism policy in the present environment is that no country can achieve its security goals alone.
As such, the EU framework is well placed to oversee work among member countries in areas of key cross-border interdependency, like the security of transport hubs, multi-national critical infrastructure and supply lines, as well as joint measures to combat terrorist financing and the implementation of innovative legal instruments, like the European Arrest Warrant.
In coordinating EU-wide engagement with the international community, it may be able to add, where appropriate, to the participation of individual member states in international and regional mechanisms for promoting stability and security, and confronting terrorism.
Australia and the EU
Australia's links with members of the EU are important for the work ASIO does to protect Australians and Australian interests at home and abroad.
At the broadest level, it is in our national interest that the EU, with its considerable resources, and longstanding links to many parts of the world, understands our security goals, and is open to cooperative engagement in areas of mutual interest.
The EU's support for the joint Australian-Indonesian initiative, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which was set up to enhance the ability of South East Asian authorities to combat terrorism, illustrates the value of such multilateral cooperation.
Given the growth of global terrorism, and other trans-national security issues, many of ASIO's investigations have an international dimension, and therefore are assisted greatly by access to intelligence and shared capabilities made possible by our liaison partnerships around the world, including with members of the EU.
This holds equally for other Australian agencies involved in counter-terrorism work, and the AFP and EUROPOL recently made an agreement to facilitate the exchange of information.
Information exchange and dialogue between Australian and European officials also builds a mutual understanding of the nature of the global security environment in which we work, including in areas of common concern, like:
the growth of extremist ideology,
the trans-national linkages between extremist groups and networks, and
the radicalisation of members of the community.
Globalisation is increasing the interdependencies between economies, and therefore the depth of mutual interest that countries have in preventing politically motivated violence and others sources of insecurity.
So, returning to the significant trade relationship between Australia and the EU, I would like to finish by indicating what ASIO is doing to assist the private sector in the area of security risk management decision-making.
The European Australian Business Council champions business links between the EU and Australia, and so my first point is that our key initiatives endeavour to assist all businesses operating within Australia - whether they are Australian or not - as well as Australian businesses with overseas operations.
Our Business Liaison Unit (BLU) liaises directly with the private sector, and operates a website designed to raise awareness about national security threats and how they relate to business.
The BLU website is password protected but available to all businesses on a free subscription basis; and this includes European companies operating in Australia.
Companies that subscribe to the website gain access to a wide range of Business Security Reports, which cover industry sector threat information, awareness about emerging trends and tactics, and national security incident briefings.
We also continue to work hard to assist Australian companies operating overseas.
Through the BLU and the National Threat Assessment Centre, we are currently establishing a register of Australian commercial interests overseas.
This register, which is voluntary, will allow Australian companies to lodge information about their overseas interests on a purpose-built, secure database within ASIO.
ASIO is often the first government agency to receive emerging threat information.
And so we aim to use the information provided by companies to better leverage our 24/7 reporting capability, which should greatly assist the Government to carry out emergency response activities abroad, should that need arise.
The information will also help ASIO to target more effectively its overseas threat reporting to help business better understand the nature of the security environments in which they operate.
Concluding note
I've previously made the point that the business of intelligence is becoming more closely aligned to a range of areas of government, and is evolving with, and helping to shape, the prospects of a modern, globally integrated country.
This necessarily means that ASIO must continue to work hard to ensure we can add value to the private sector by providing timely and relevant advice to help companies assess the security risks they face.
In a complex global environment, we cannot do this alone, and our active engagement with a range of international partners, including within the EU, is vital for our ability to protect Australians, and Australia's interests, here and abroad.
Just as importantly, Australia must continue to engage the EU as it undertakes the task of transforming its collective security arrangements into a framework able to contribute to the major international security challenges.