DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S ADDRESS
SECURITY LEGISLATION REVIEW COMMITTEE
8 MARCH 2006
Challenges of Australia's Security Environment
Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to share some of my perspectives on Australia's security environment; the practical implications for ASIO of recent legislative change; and to provide some insight into the challenges ahead that may help inform this committee's deliberations.
While much of ASIO's focus and resources since 2001 have been directed at counter-terrorism, we should not lose sight of the fact that Australia's security environment consists of other elements - as defined in the ASIO Act - that are a threat to Australians and Australian interests.
I'm referring here to the protection of the people of Australia from espionage, sabotage, the promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system; or acts of foreign interference.
I would add that our responsibility for these matters is not geographically limited to Australia's shores alone, but applies whether they are directed from, or committed within, Australia or not.
And that our ability to investigate and counter effectively these other sources of threat will be significantly enhanced by the additional resources the Government has committed to ASIO over the next five years.
Let me focus on the threat of terrorism which, I am sure, is of particular interest to this committee.
Terrorism is one of the most complex and serious threats this country has faced for several decades.
The problem is an ongoing one.
It exists today and is going to exist well into the future.
That means that the work of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in connection with counter-terrorism will remain central to the work of the Government and important to the people of Australia.
That work needs to continue within the context of a relevant and appropriate legislative framework.
Our assessment of the level of threat to Australia and Australians from terrorism has changed over time.
It is something that remains under continuous review.
If we look back to a time before the events of September 2001, our assessment was that Australia was generally at the lower end of the threat spectrum.
Certainly there had been terrorist attacks in Australia in the 1970s and 1980s. You will recall the:
1978 Hilton hotel bombing in Sydney;
1980 assassination of the Turkish Consul-General in Sydney;
1982 bombing of the Israeli Consulate-General and Hakoah club in Sydney; and
1986 bombing at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne
While these attacks occurred in Australia, they were perceived to be directed against 'foreign interests' - not specifically against Australians even though there were some Australian victims.
At that time, our assessment remained that while terrorist attacks in Australia were possible, such attacks were unlikely.
However, the September 2001 attacks in the United States demonstrated all too clearly that it is possible for capable and committed terrorists to operate undetected and mount a successful attack.
ASIO subsequently revised its assessment of the threat and the level of alert was raised to medium - that means, by definition, a terrorist attack in Australia is feasible and could well occur.
It has remained that way since September 2001.
While the general level of alert in Australia is medium, the threat to United States, British and Israeli interests in Australia is assessed to be higher.
Our assessment currently is based on a body of intelligence, public statements and actual attacks that show that Australia and Australians are considered to be legitimate targets for terrorist attacks.
Unlike the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, it is a threat directed not only against foreign interests in Australia but against Australians and the country itself.
To further increase the level of alert will only occur on the basis of specific and credible intelligence about a threat.
To increase the level of alert on the basis of other than rigorous analysis and informed assessment would undermine confidence in the effectiveness of Australia's counter-terrorism machinery and the quality of ASIO's advice.
Within this environment it is essential that we keep pace with, if not ahead, of the challenge posed by persistent, capable and committed extremists.
I have previously spoken publicly about the three major sources of terrorist threat to Australians in Australia and we've had instances of all of them since 2000.
Firstly, someone could come here, more or less self contained, to do harm.
The second possibility is that one or more people come here and link up with locals who assist in planning or conducting an attack.
And the third is the so-called 'home grown terrorism' where people born in Australia, or those who have come here at a young age, are motivated to plan and conduct an attack here without overseas direction or support.
Together with our law enforcement partners, we have had some success in identifying and disrupting planning by would-be terrorists across all three of these broad scenarios.
Our collective ability to achieve this outcome has been enhanced by the additional resources committed by the Government and the legislative framework put in place by the Parliament.
Of continuing concern though, and a major challenge facing us, is the terrorist that we don't know about.
It is naïve to think that, even with the resources that we have now or will have in the future, we can know about every small group in this country that may be thinking of doing harm. We cannot.
So the challenge comes down to balancing how we deploy our resources against known sources of threat while devoting resources to identifying and understanding previously unknown sources of threat, including from so-called 'non-traditional areas.'
And working with other agencies to ensure such individuals and groups are not able to achieve their objectives.
In this regard, arbitrary and ill-informed speculation about the number of would-be terrorists in the community is unhelpful and ultimately pointless.
If you look just at the attacks around the world in 2005, they were generally conducted by small groups. Their effectiveness stemmed from their ability to operate undetected and appear unremarkable within the community, not from being part of a large, organised group.
Putting a precise figure on the number of potential terrorists in the country also is meaningless because it implies the problem is easily quantifiable and confined to a finite number of people.
The problem is not static - people move along a continuum. People can move from being apparently ordinary members of the community into being much more actively involved in terrorist activities in a very short period of time.
If you look at the London bombings of July 2005 you see examples of people who were apparently out there in the community, members of British society and then, in a short time, they engage in suicide bombings.
The speed of this radicalising process means that categorising people is futile.
In terms of the threat of espionage, the point I would make is that it is very naïve to think that the interests that nation states pursued somehow ceased with the end of the Cold War.
Australia today remains a significant player in many contexts.
We have a large and growing industrial and manufacturing base.
We have highly developed international networks.
To think that other governments wouldn't try to penetrate those systems or try to obtain details of what our government does and thinks would be quite unfounded.
Just as we need appropriate laws in the fight against the threat of terrorism, so also do we need an effective framework to counter the threat of espionage from nation states.
Let me turn now to what have been the practical implications of recent legislative amendments, primarily in connection with counter-terrorism but also in response to the threat of espionage.
From ASIO's perspective, the legislative changes since 2002 have been effective in strengthening the counter-terrorism framework to allow ASIO and other agencies better to respond to the threat of terrorism.
Perhaps the most significant legislative change - certainly the one that attracted the most public debate and most intense parliamentary scrutiny - was the enactment in 2003 of questioning and detention powers for ASIO.
There continues to be some confusion surrounding the use of these powers and other aspects of ASIO's work.
At the outset, may I say that they have been used strictly in accordance with the legislation.
That is, only as a matter of last resort, and only to obtain intelligence related to terrorism where relying on other methods would be ineffective.
While I cannot go into detail, I can say that these powers have proven to be a useful tool that has resulted in valuable intelligence.
In the period from their introduction in 2003 to 30 June 2005 the questioning powers had been used against 13 people - all of whom were adults.
Subsequent amendments to these provisions of the ASIO Act were made in the light of practical experience and have served to strengthen the powers and ensure they can be used in the manner intended.
Were extreme circumstances to arise, the power to exercise a detention warrant could be essential to the prevention of a terrorist attack.
In ASIO's view, the detention powers remain essential to the legislation.
These powers can be used (in general terms) only when the subject is considered to be a 'flight risk', is likely to 'tip-off' another person under investigation, or could destroy something relevant to an investigation.
ASIO is required by legislation to report publicly on the use of these powers in its annual Report to Parliament, and has done so in each of its Annual Reports since the powers were enacted.
ASIO provided interim reporting to the then Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD in the course of its review into the powers, about the number of times ASIO had used these powers.
Other legislative changes since 2002 have generally enhanced ASIO's ability to:
provide ASIO security assessments to Federal, State and Territory agencies concerning access to ammonium nitrate and other substances on security grounds; and
keep pace with technological advances in connection with telecommunications interception.
These measures did not increase ASIO's powers but they have made it easier for ASIO to keep pace with technological changes and effectively to fulfil its functions to both traditional and new clients - including in the private sector.
Other more general legislative initiatives have included the enactment of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 which put in place measures to protect classified information in legal proceedings.
Further, the Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Offences) Act 2002 strengthened criminal provisions relating to the disclosure of national security information and increased the maximum penalty for espionage from 7 to 25 years imprisonment.
Having an appropriate legislative framework for national security, particularly one that will allow for the prosecution and, where appropriate, the incarceration of terrorists and those who would provide aid or assistance to them before they can achieve their objectives is of fundamental importance.
The Parliament has made substantial progress towards achieving a legislative framework that is relevant and effective in the current security environment and one which is not reliant on laws and practices more suited to an earlier time.
The radicalisation process, to which I referred earlier, is ongoing and we need the capabilities and laws that will allow us to identify those individuals and groups who may not have come to notice previously but who are intent on doing harm.
The security tradecraft of extremists in Australia has increased substantially and intelligence and law enforcement agencies need the powers and capabilities to cope with this aspect of the challenge.
Discussion of such issues will, quite properly, take place against a wider public debate about the balance between protecting the community from the threat of terrorism, on the one hand and the guarding of civil liberties and human rights considerations on the other.
I can assure you that ASIO remains very aware of these issues and is appropriately sensitive to human rights and civil liberties.
And ASIO's policies, procedures and training take account of the impact of our actions on individuals.
ASIO investigations are conducted in accordance with protocols that require the level of any personal intrusion to be commensurate with the associated threat.
These intrusive methods are necessary against subjects of investigation who are increasingly adept at concealing their activities and intentions.
But they are used in ways which are accountable and transparent - through a rigorous and extensive program of oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security - and which, at all times, are conducted with legality and propriety.
Let me leave you with these thoughts.
The threats to Australia's security will continue for some time to come.
Countering the threat of terrorism will continue to be a primary focus but it is not the only security threat to Australia.
Our own experience and that of our international partners shows that those who would do harm are persistent, resourceful, capable and committed.
We need continuously to evaluate the effectiveness of our methods and the adequacy and relevance of our legislative framework, and to challenge our underlying assumptions to ensure that what we are doing is well targeted, appropriate and legally sound.
And as an Organisation we need to be creative and innovative if we are to stay ahead of the challenge and meet our responsibility to protect Australia and Australians.
Thank you.